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Real Insider Trading
Michael A. Perino†
Abstract
In popular rhetoric, insider trading cases are about leveling
the playing field between elite market participants and ordinary
investors. Academic critiques vary. Some depict an untethered
insider trading doctrine that enforcers use to expand their power
and enhance their discretion. Others see enforcers beset with
agency cost problems who bring predominantly simple, easily
resolved cases to create the veneer of vigorous enforcement. The
debate has, to this point, been based mostly on anecdote and
conjecture rather than empirical evidence. This Article addresses
that gap by collecting extensive data on 465 individual
defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions to
assess how enforcers operationalize insider trading doctrine. The
cases enforcement authorities bring are shaped by a complex and
cross-cutting set of institutional and individual incentives,
cognitive biases, legal requirements, the history of failed
enforcement efforts, and the way in which the agency and the
self-regulatory organizations deploy their investigatory
resources. SEC enforcement is dominated by small stakes,
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opportunistic trading by mid-level employees and their friends
and family, most often involving M&A transactions. Those cases
settle quickly, half within thirty days of filing. Criminal
enforcement is generally reserved for more serious cases,
measured by, among other things, the type of defendant, the size
of the insider trading network, and the profits earned. In both
settings, there is little evidence that enforcers are systematically
stretching the boundaries of insider trading doctrine.
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REAL INSIDER TRADING
I.

Introduction

Early on a September morning in 2012, two FBI agents
knocked on John Johnson’s door.1 Johnson, in his mid-forties,
had been a securities market professional (SMP) for years, and
was, at the time, the Chief Investment Officer for a public
pension fund.2 The agents wanted to know about a trade he
made in his personal account in July 2008.3 Just a few days
before Brocade Communications, Inc. announced it was
acquiring Foundry Networks, Inc., Johnson bought a small
number of out-of-the-money Foundry call options and common
shares.4 Foundry’s stock price rose 32 percent and Johnson
made $136,000.5 Johnson admitted to the agents that he traded
on material nonpublic information (MNPI) and agreed to
cooperate in a criminal case brought against his immediate
source, a hedge fund employee, and the original source of the
information, Foundry’s Chief Information Officer.6 Johnson pled
guilty7 and, due in part to his cooperation, was fined and given
a suspended sentence.8
I had the opportunity to interview Johnson, and I asked him
why he traded and why he thought he could get away with it. 9
Recently divorced and unemployed, Johnson was desperate for
money.10 But he also thought that prosecutors and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would not bother
with him.11 Johnson believed that insider trading was endemic
1. See Telephone Interview with John Johnson (Mar. 29, 2019)
(recounting the story).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Teeple, No. 13-cv-2010 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,
2013), ECF No. 1.
5. Id. ¶ 4.
6. Interview with John Johnson, supra note 1.
7. United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 183, 191–92 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
8. Nate Raymond, Ex-Wyoming Fund Exec Turned Insider Trading
Witness Avoids Prison, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2015, 4:12 PM),
https://perma.cc/4V73-LE84 (PDF).
9. Interview with John Johnson, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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among professional traders and that far more prominent traders
were exploiting this kind of information on a massive scale, far
in excess of his one comparatively small trade.12 “I was,” he told
me, “just a guy from Denver.”13
Johnson’s impression of how and why enforcers target
insider trading is not unusual. In popular rhetoric, insider
trading prosecutions are about leveling the playing field and
making markets fair for ordinary investors.14 The former United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet
Bharara, whose office prosecuted Johnson, called insider
traders “cheaters” who “rigged” the market, and he vowed to
“investigate and prosecute this crime aggressively.”15 Insider
trading rhetoric has always had a populist overtone, and
Bharara saved special condemnation for the “most advantaged,
privileged, and wealthy insiders in modern finance,” who violate
the law to reap even greater wealth or to benefit “their friends
and relatives at the expense of the trading public.”16 The SEC
generally views insider trading enforcement as a core
component of its investor protection mandate, leading SEC
officials to similar promises.17
Johnson’s confidence that enforcement authorities would
not bother with his case was clearly wrong, at least in hindsight.
But was he just unlucky, or did he fundamentally
misunderstand how prosecutors and the SEC actually deploy
their enforcement resources?
That question is subject to a wide-ranging debate. Indeed,
enforcement rhetoric is far removed from the critique of insider
trading generally found on law review pages. While some argue
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Preet Bharara, The Future of White Collar Enforcement: A
Prosecutor’s View, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUST., https://perma.cc/KR9J-EEV6 (last
updated May 13, 2015) (explaining that the fight against white collar crime
stems from a commitment to the principle that markets should be fair, playing
fields should be level, and citizens’ accounts should be secure).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See
What
We
Do,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/XA4D-W5TD (last updated June 10, 2013) (including the
investigation of insider trading among the important aspects of protecting
investors).
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that most forms of insider trading should be legal,18 much of the
current criticism focuses on regulation and enforcement. Many
commentators complain that Congress, largely for political
expediency, has never defined it. 19 Instead, insider trading is
enforced through Section 10(b)’s catch-all antifraud provision,20
leading to a doctrine that is poorly theorized and riddled with
inconsistencies.21 To avoid a blueprint for fraud the SEC has
eschewed bright-line rules,22 but critics charge this approach is
more about maximizing agency power and discretion than it is
about preventing clever insider trading schemes.23 “The result
of executive agency ambiguity layered on top of congressional
ambiguity,” one set of critics complained, “is judicial power to
decide what is and what is not illegal,”24 which raises separation
of powers, accountability, and due process concerns, especially
in criminal prosecutions.25
For legal academics, the doctrinal problems are legion.
They fret over the uncertain parameters of materiality.26 They
worry about the lack of clarity regarding which duties of trust
and confidence are sufficient to give rise to an insider trading
claim if breached27 or whether liability should be based on such

18. See generally JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND
REFORM (2018).
19. See Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE
L.J.F. 129, 145–48 (2017).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
21. See Baer, supra note 19, at 138–45.
22. See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 559
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb.
Affs., 98th Cong. 35–38 (1984) (statement of John Fedders, Director, SEC
Enforcement Division).
23. See Jonathan R. Macey, Deconstructing the Galleon Insider Trading
Case, WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/5TKY-7FXT (last updated Apr. 19, 2011).
24. M. Todd Henderson et al., Offensive Disclosure: How Voluntary
Disclosure Can Increase Returns from Insider Trading, 103 GEO. L.J. 1275,
1280 (2015).
25. See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and
Independence for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 976–77 (2017);
Baer, supra note 19, at 145–48.
26. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on
Materiality Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2012).
27. See ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 75–78.
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duties.28 Much recent scholarship focuses on what if any benefit
a tipper must receive in order to create liability for tippees. 29
And there is a general sense that enforcers have exploited these
gaps and uncertainties to expand insider trading liability too
far,30 a view occasionally reinforced in the popular press when
enforcers target high-profile defendants.31 Some see civil and
criminal enforcers as a tag-team, with the SEC and the judiciary
liberally expanding the scope of liability in civil cases with lower
burdens of proof and prosecutors exploiting those precedents to
overreach in criminal ones.32
But these critiques of aggressive and expansive litigation
sit uncomfortably beside broader challenges to enforcement
choices. Jonathan Macey and others argue that the SEC has
strong institutional incentives to maximize the total number of
cases brought and resolved and the penalties collected because
congressional overseers tend to focus on those simple metrics to
measure SEC effectiveness.33 The agency therefore goes after
“low-hanging fruit;” it avoids difficult, time consuming cases
against high-profile or well-resourced defendants in favor of
easy ones that are likely to settle quickly.34 U.S. Attorneys have

28. See James D. Cox, Seeking an Objective for Regulating Insider
Trading Through Texas Gulf Sulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. 697, 706 (2018);
Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading
After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1489 (2016).
29. See Baer, supra note 19, at 129–34; Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks:
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 48–51 (2016).
30. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 64, 72 (2016) (“The government’s objection to the status
quo as reflected in Dirks and Newman is not to the ambiguity of these
decisions but rather to the restraints they impose on the government’s power
and prosecutorial discretion.”).
31. See Jeff Cox, Leon Cooperman: SEC Insider Trading Case Was
“Extraordinarily Abusive,” CNBC (May 30, 2017, 12:18 PM),
https://perma.cc/5T8E-5SEY (last updated May 30, 2017, 2:34 PM).
32. See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider
Trading, 69 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 55, 63 (2016).
33. Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 644, 646
(2010); see Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement,
127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863–95 (2014).
34. See Macey, supra note 33, at 646–47.
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been similarly criticized for their unwillingness to try cases
unless they have overwhelming evidence of guilt.35
None of these depictions seems entirely satisfying.
Enforcement rhetoric is clearly overblown. Numerous
high-profile targets have gone unprosecuted despite strong
evidence of guilt while small traders, who are neither privileged
nor wealthy, are frequently targeted. Pursuing expansive
definitions
of
insider
trading,
particularly
against
well-resourced defendants, is a poor strategic choice for an
agency bent on maximizing quick settlements as these cases are
likely to be vigorously contested. And, while there are certainly
ambiguities in insider trading law, are those ambiguities really
any more substantial than the ambiguities found in mail and
wire fraud or other white collar offenses?36 But beyond these
generalities the fundamental problem in evaluating these
competing claims is that we lack the data necessary to
rigorously analyze them.
What we know about law enforcement efforts typically
comes from reported opinions and from journalistic accounts of
prominent cases.37 While such sources are useful, they can be
misleading for obtaining an accurate picture of real insider
trading enforcement as it actually occurs on the ground.
Doctrinal scholarship often devotes inordinate attention to the
latest Supreme Court opinion or to cases with unusual fact
patterns. Such scholarship can highlight otherwise obscure
inconsistencies or doctrinal gaps, but without reliable data
showing how those cases fit into the broader framework of
insider trading enforcement, we run the risk that those lacunae
35.
36.

See JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB 293 (2017).
See Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged? 63
DUKE L.J. 823, 842–43 (2014).
37. See generally SHEELAH KOLHATKAR, BLACK EDGE (2017) (analyzing the
governmental investigation of Steven A. Cohen’s hedge fund); CHARLES
GASPARINO, CIRCLE OF FRIENDS (2013) (tracing the prosecution of several
high-profile insider trading cases); JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991)
(exploring insider trading scandals of the 1980s). A few studies have provided
some limited descriptive statistics of insider trading enforcement. See, e.g.,
Chien Chung Lin & Eric Hung, U.S. Insider Trading Law Enforcement: Issues
and Survey of SEC Actions from 2009 to 2013, 11 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 37,
54–65 (2016) (analysis of insider trading enforcement from 2009 through
2013).
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will assume outsized importance in academic and policy
debates. Examining how SEC enforcement officials and
prosecutors operationalize insider trading doctrine allows
scholars and legislators to evaluate more reliably whether
enforcers consistently overreach or under-enforce.38
Relying on a hand-collected sample of 465 individual
defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions, this
article separates the myths and the realities of insider trading
enforcement. Who actually gets targeted in insider trading
enforcement actions? What kinds of MNPI are typically at
issue? What kinds of duties tend to give rise to enforcement
actions? What if any significant differences exist between civil
and criminal enforcement? While my goals are thus largely
descriptive, I do offer explanations for the observed enforcement
patterns and reveal previously undisclosed information about
the SEC’s own internal analyses of the effectiveness of its
surveillance techniques.
There is little evidence that enforcers are systematically
stretching the boundaries of insider trading doctrine. For
example, there is little doubt about the significance of the MNPI
typically at issue. More than 93 percent of cases involve one of
three types: information about impending M&A transactions;
unannounced quarterly or other financial results; and
unannounced results from pharmaceutical or other medical
product trials.39 Two-thirds of cases involve straightforward
breaches of duty, most typically arising from employment or
other traditional fiduciary relationships.40 There are few remote
tippees targeted in enforcement actions.41 Over 70 percent of
defendants are either the original source of the information or a
first level tippee.42 When remote tippees are targeted they
typically obtain the information directly from the first level

38. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1131–38 (2016) (calling for greater scrutiny of
enforcement discretion); Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1049–51 (2013) (same).
39. See infra Table 2.
40. See infra Table 1.
41. See infra Part VII.D.
42. See infra Table 10.
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tippee.43 Overall, 92 percent of defendants fall into one of these
categories.44
Naturally, one can find counterexamples, especially in civil
actions alleging non-traditional duties of trust and confidence
and occasionally with respect to materiality.45 But these cases
are the outliers not the norm. Most cases fall squarely into what
the Supreme Court recently called the “heartland” of insider
trading doctrine.46 There are certainly enforcement issues that
could benefit from more precise statutory language, but the data
give little reason to believe that Congress should legislate to
curb overly aggressive enforcement.47
The observable enforcement patterns also reveal much
about how enforcers operate. These data suggest that the cases
SEC and criminal enforcement authorities bring are shaped by
a complex and sometimes cross-cutting set of institutional and
individual incentives, cognitive biases, legal requirements, the
history of failed enforcement efforts, and the way in which the
agency and the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) deploy
their resources to identify improper trades.48 There is a good
deal of evidence suggesting that SEC enforcement is dominated
by easy cases that settle quickly.49 Nearly half of civil
enforcement actions settle within thirty days of filing.50 Median
direct profits in these cases—which are often against mid-level
employees or their friends and family—are less than $50,000,
not the millions typically trumpeted in enforcement rhetoric.51
43. See infra Part VII.D.
44. See infra Table 10.
45. See infra Parts V–VI.
46. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016).
47. Legislative fixes could beneficially close some gaps in existing
doctrine. For example, proposed legislation defines outright theft of MNPI,
such as through computer hacking schemes, as insider trading. See SEC v.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding the case to determine
whether a fraudulent misrepresentation in a computer hacking scheme was
“deceptive” for the purposes of § 10(b)); Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R.
2534, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to explicitly codify a ban on insider
trading).
48. See infra Part III.
49. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
50. See infra Table 7.
51. See infra Table 11.
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Rather than being a mechanism for leveling the playing field
between elite market participants and retail investors, insider
trading, especially on the civil side, turns out to be a
middle-class violation.52
The prevalence of these actions raises important questions
about whether civil enforcement can effectively deter
sophisticated insider trading schemes. Indeed, a previously
undisclosed SEC analysis found that existing surveillance
techniques were adequate to identify this kind of opportunistic
trading but sometimes missed coordinated trading among
sophisticated SMP.53 While the SEC has altered some of its
surveillance techniques to try to rectify these problems, its
docket continues to be shaped as much by the agency’s inability
to try large numbers of cases and individual attorneys’ biases
toward low risk matters as they are by attempts to pad
statistics. There are, as well, systematic differences between
cases with and without criminal enforcement—criminal
enforcement is generally reserved for more serious cases,
measured by, among other things the type of defendant, the size
of the insider trading network, and the profits earned.54 But like
civil cases, the criminal cases tend to be those in which liability
is fairly certain.
There is a simple and obvious explanation for these
patterns. On both the individual and institutional level
enforcers want to win and bringing novel or uncertain cases
increases the chances they will not. For example, the SEC lost
more than 16 percent of cases against tippees more than two
steps removed from the source compared to just 6.5 percent of
cases against other defendants.55 Courts thus appear to act as
an effective check on enforcement overreach, one to which the
SEC is highly responsive. After the Second Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Newman,56 which made it harder to pursue
actions against remote tippees, the SEC did not bring a single
52. See infra Table 11.
53. Telephone Interview with Daniel M. Hawke, Former SEC
Enforcement Official (July 1, 2019) [hereinafter “Hawke Interview”].
54. See infra Part VII.F.
55. See infra Part VII.D.
56. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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action against a tippee more than two steps removed from the
source during the remainder of the study period.57 Courts,
enforcers, and defense counsel are engaged in an ongoing dialog
that both limits the expansive application of insider trading
doctrine and generates the kind of interstitial, dynamic
lawmaking that would be difficult for Congress to provide.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part II begins by
sketching in more detail the rhetoric of insider trading
enforcement. Part III describes the institutional and individual
incentives enforcers face when they operationalize their
enforcement strategies. Part IV describes the dataset. Part V
discusses how materiality is defined in litigated cases. Part VI
examines the duties of trust and confidence at issue in filed
enforcement actions, a key feature of actions alleging that
individuals misappropriated information from a source. Part
VII explores the targets of civil and criminal insider trading
enforcement. Brief concluding remarks follow. A data appendix
provides additional description of the variables studied.
II.

The Rhetoric and Critique of Insider Trading Enforcement
A.

Insider Trading Rhetoric

Insider trading has a set of stock narratives and metaphors
that shape the way the public, lawyers, and judges talk and
write about it.58 The laws prohibiting it have an enormous
symbolic resonance and the law’s narrative conventions tend to
flow from and reinforce that message. As Donald Langevoort
has argued, insider trading law expresses a deep social
commitment to equal opportunity along with a desire for strict
adherence to fiduciary obligations.59 Insider trading embodies a

57. See infra Table 10.
58. See Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg, Introduction to NARRATIVE
AND METAPHOR IN THE LAW 1, 1–10 (Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg eds.,
2018) (examining the function of narrative and metaphor in legal theory and
practice).
59. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology
and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1327–31
(1999).
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revulsion for elite special privileges.60 Concerns about it
similarly reflect our perennially ambivalent attitudes regarding
the morality and mores of SMPs.61
When insider trading pervades the common consciousness,
it tends to follow a narrow set of story lines. For the better part
of two centuries Wall Street has been a recurring villain in
American life,62 and it is unsurprising to find the stock market
operator at the center of many insider trading morality plays.
Ivan Boesky,63 Raj Rajaratnam,64 Steven Cohen,65 and Gordon
Gekko66—real and fictional insider traders—exploit their
market savvy and superior access to MNPI to earn undeserved
wealth at the expense of ordinary investors. Their profits come
not from productive hard work, but from jumping the line ahead
of less sophisticated or less connected investors.
Corporate executives,67 directors,68 and even members of
Congress69 act wrongfully when they breach a fiduciary or other
well-recognized duty of trust and confidence to misappropriate
information for personal gain or to pass it on to friends and
60. See id. at 1328–29.
61. See Michael A. Perino, The Lost History of Insider Trading, 2019 U.
ILL. L. REV. 951, 967–71 (2019) (historical analysis of legal treatment of and
attitudes regarding insider trading).
62. See STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR 412 (2005) (“There were
plenty of enemies out there, many candidates vying for the role of ‘the big bad
wolf.’ But the biggest and baddest wolf everyone, or nearly everyone, would
have settled on was Wall Street.”).
63. See STEWART, supra note 37, at 81–206.
64. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
65. See Cohen, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 4307, 2016
SEC LEXIS 3256 (Jan. 8, 2016).
66. See WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1259 (10th Cir.
2009) (affirming the insider trading conviction of Joseph Nacchio, former CEO
of Qwest Communications International, Inc.).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2014)
(upholding the securities fraud convictions of Rajat Gupta, a director of
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.).
69. See Michael A. Perino, A Scandalous Perversion of Trust: Modern
Lessons from the Early History of Congressional Insider Trading, 67 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 335, 391–92 (2014) (examining congressional insider trading and
questioning the necessity of its legislative prohibition).
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family. Neither courts70 nor the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines71
look favorably on such defendants. But really any famous
defendant works to tell a story about unfair advantages
inappropriately conferred on the favored few.72 That (along with
a healthy dose of schadenfreude) is why insider trading scandals
involving public figures (Martha Stewart, for example) garner
outsized attention as compared to their size and significance.73
In a more cynical version of this narrative, insider trading
became a crime because those without wealth or privileged
access to information envied those who did. 74 Congress and
enforcement officials capitalized on those sentiments to help
legitimize their own positions. 75 As Thomas Joo has argued,
condemning insider trading allowed government officials to
translate “economic issues into a moral conflict in which the
government clearly held the high ground.”76 Insider trading
prosecutions could distract from more complicated, intractable
problems in capital markets.77 During economic crises, insider
trading focused attention on an easily understood and
seemingly unfair practice and away from the more complex,
difficult roots of those upheavals—systemic problems that legal
standards and enforcement officials may have been ill-equipped
to address.78 Clearly, enforcers act illegitimately if they put
these kinds of political needs ahead of public interest. As

70. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (asserting that the defendant “brazenly” breached his fiduciary duty).
71. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018) (imposing an additional penalty when a defendant abuses a position of
trust); see also id. § 2B1.4 (addressing insider trading).
72. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., Martha Stewart Settles Civil
Insider-Trading
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
7,
2006),
https://perma.cc/KCG9-MBBV (reporting Martha Stewart’s settlement
agreement regarding her insider trading charges).
74. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of
Martha Stewart, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2026 n.13 (2005).
75. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and
Insider Trading in the 1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575, 575 (2007).
76. Id. at 602.
77. See id. at 576.
78. See id.
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Margaret Lemos has written, we should “disapprove of
enforcement decisions that echo the angry mob.”79
The rhetoric justifying enforcement efforts leans heavily on
gambling and sports metaphors and reinforces the dominant
narrative. Courts have branded convicted insider traders as
“cheats” who take unfair advantage of ordinary investors.80 The
most common justification for prohibiting insider trading is that
it undermines public confidence in the integrity of the stock
market.81 Without that confidence, ordinary investors would
refuse to invest, ultimately impairing capital formation.82 Or, as
the Supreme Court observed: “Who would knowingly roll the
dice in a crooked crap game?”83
SEC officials thus portray themselves as vigorous
guardians of market fairness.84 Insider trading enforcement has
been a central focus of the SEC’s efforts since at least 1981,
when Chairman John Shad announced that the agency would
“comedown on insider trading with hobnail boots.”85 A decade
later, another chairman vowed to leave a defendant, “naked,
homeless, and without wheels.” 86 In the ensuing years, other
SEC officials, albeit in less colorful language, have consistently
asserted that policing insider trading “bolster[s] the confidence
so necessary for our markets to thrive.”87

79. Lemos, supra note 25, at 964.
80. See SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
81. See Perino, supra note 61, at 952 n.1.
82. See id. at 957.
83. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (determining that an act is necessary “to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets”).
85. Leslie Wayne, Inside Trading by Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1984
(§ 3), at 1.
86. Jonathan Meyer Eisenberg, Enforcement Issues and Litigation, 21
SEC. REGUL. L.J. 421, 421–22 (1994) (quoting Kevin G. Salwen & Laurie P.
Cohen, SEC Under Breeden Takes a Harder Line on Securities Crime, WALL
ST. J., May 10, 1990, at A1).
87. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at
the Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks (Feb. 24, 2012),
https://perma.cc/JB8T-4SQ3 (PDF).
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SEC rhetoric also tends to focus on the resources deployed
to detect even small and obscure violations.88 After the financial
crisis, the SEC invested in information technology designed to
root out cases that may have previously gone undetected. 89 It
was part of a larger “broken windows” enforcement approach
that sought to bring “cases against traders of all different types”
and to pursue “every level of violation.”90
Nowhere was the rhetoric about fairness, status, and
privilege more prominent than in the public statements of the
prosecutors who spearheaded the post-financial crisis
crackdown on insider trading.91 Enforcing those proscriptions,
former U.S. Attorney Bharara observed, was a commitment that
“our markets should be fair; that our playing fields should be
level; and that our citizens’ accounts should be secure.”92
Prosecutorial efforts sought to protect a “free and fair
marketplace” where ordinary investors did not have to fear that
privileged insiders were rigging the market.93 For Bharara,
88. See Oversight of the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY 2015 Budget
Request Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 57 (2014) (statement
of Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), https://perma.cc/K4EQ8JSL (PDF) (“[W]e have continued to improve our efficiency and effectiveness
by . . . deploying more risk-based analytics to allow us to do more with our
resources, and to do so more quickly.”).
89. See MARY L. SCHAPIRO, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 2, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2010), https://perma.cc/8E2G-YWWG
(PDF).
90. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before
the SEC Historical Society (June 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/S23B-CDMK
(PDF); Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the
Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/S8FQ-TWNV
(PDF).
91. See Bharara, supra note 14.
92. Id.
93. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Managing Director of
Investment Bank Found Guilty of Insider Trading Charges (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://perma.cc/LF67-UKJ5 (PDF) (“Insider trading rigs the securities
markets in favor of cheaters, and we will continue to investigate and prosecute
this crime aggressively.”); Massimo Calabresi & Bill Saporito, The Street
Fighter, TIME, Feb. 13, 2012, at 23, https://perma.cc/BX8G-XYUY (PDF)
‘Insider trading tells everybody at precisely the wrong time that
everything is rigged,’ [Bharara] says, ‘and only people who have a
billion dollars and have access to and are best friends with people
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insider trading was most pernicious and harmful when it was
committed by the wealthy or by SMPs.94 “Disturbingly,” he
noted, “many of the people who are going to such lengths to
obtain inside information for a trading advantage are already
among the most advantaged, privileged, and wealthy insiders in
modern finance,”95 and he decried a “creeping culture of
corruption”96 on Wall Street.
Enforcement rhetoric thus focuses on issues of market
integrity and fairness. It emphasizes the role that civil and
criminal actions play in maintaining a level playing field. And
it targets its sharpest criticism for SMPs and the upper echelons
of corporate America, along with the wealthy and
well-connected. Legal scholars tend to see matters from a
substantially different perspective.
B.

The Academic Critique of Insider Trading

A consistent complaint in insider trading scholarship is that
insider trading is not precisely defined in any federal statute.97
The proscription has instead emerged from what Jill Fisch calls
a “lawmaking partnership” between Congress, the SEC, federal
prosecutors, and the courts.98

who are on boards of directors of major companies—they’re the only
ones who can make a true buck.’
94. See Preet Bharara, Why Corporate Fraud Is so Rampant: Wall Street’s
Cop, CNBC (July 23, 2012, 1:33 PM), https://perma.cc/43UC-FABB (“We have
witnessed the most educated, successful, and monied professionals in the
country put their companies—not to mention their own liberty—at risk by
engaging in flagrant and foolhardy illegal conduct.”).
95. Bharara, supra note 14.
96. Calabresi & Saporito, supra note 93, at 23.
97. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Tippees and Tippers: The Impact of Martoma
II, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 23, 2018),
https://perma.cc/T4JQ-NQL6 (“Congress should take up the difficult and
dangerous task of turning a common law crime into a real statute.”). Recently,
Bharara agreed to lead a task force that would propose changes to update
insider trading law. See Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Opinion,
Insider Trading Laws Haven’t Kept Up with the Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
2018), https://perma.cc/5AQF-UPMD.
98. Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking
Partnership, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 480–81 (2015).
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The most frequently used statute does not mention insider
trading. Section 10(b) empowers the SEC to promulgate rules
prohibiting “any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance . . . .”99 Using that power, the SEC adopted Rule
10b-5, which prohibits material misrepresentations or
omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.100 Nineteen years after adopting Rule 10b-5, the SEC
decided in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.101 that a broker violated it
when he traded after being tipped by a director that a company
was about to cut its dividend.102
Corporate law scholar William Cary, at the time the SEC
Chairman and the author of that opinion, articulated the same
fairness concerns that would animate enforcement over the
ensuing decades.103 Prohibiting insider trading responded to
“the plight of the buying public—wholly unprotected from the
misuse of special information.”104 To promote investor
confidence, the prohibition should be broadly stated and applied
expansively, not hemmed in by the “fine distinctions and rigid
classifications” that had limited insider trading under state
common law.105
For a time, courts adopted that view, holding that the SEC’s
“abstain or disclose” rule applied to “anyone” in possession of
MNPI.106 But in a now familiar history, three Supreme Court
cases—Chiarella v. United States,107 Dirks v. SEC,108 and

99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).
101. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 SEC
LEXIS 385 (Nov. 8, 1961).
102. Id. at *4.
103. See id. at *12 (stating that the obligation for corporate insiders goes
to “the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing”).
104. Id. at *15.
105. Id. at *12; see Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the
Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 430–31
(2013) (discussing Cady, Roberts).
106. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
107. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
108. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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United States v. O’Hagan109—substantially reshaped insider
trading liability. Chiarella held that silence is only a fraud if the
trader owes a fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence to
the person on the other side of the transaction (the “classic”
theory of insider trading).110 Dirks sought to limit the liability of
tippers and tippees.111 Tippees are only liable if the original tip
was passed in breach of a fiduciary duty and if the tippees know
about the breach and that the tip involved MNPI. 112 Worried
about the inhibiting influence that an imprecise standard might
have on securities analysts, Dirks held that such breaches occur
only when the tipper receives a direct or indirect personal
benefit for making the tip, which can be a pecuniary gain, a
reputational benefit, or when he or she makes a gift of the
information to a relative or friend.113 In O’Hagan, the Court
expanded liability by endorsing the misappropriation theory,
which makes liable those who take information in breach of a
fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence owed to the
source of the information.114
Thus, for nearly sixty years, the precise contours of insider
trading liability have flowed from case law rather than precise
statutory language. Some view this lawmaking partnership as
a virtue rather than a handicap. Donna Nagy argues that
Congress’s legislative efforts have ratified and built on the
Court’s insider trading jurisprudence.115 “Congress’s multiple
determinations to forego a legislative definition,” she wrote,
“evidence not abdication, but rather concerted judgments that
fraud-based insider trading and tipping proscriptions—and the
interstitial lawmaking inherent in such proscriptions—put
securities traders on appropriate notice that transactions based
on misappropriated information will be subject to stiff civil

109. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
110. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33.
111. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660, 663–64.
112. Id. at 660.
113. See id. at 663–64.
114. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650–52.
115. Donna Nagy, Salman v. United States: Insider Trading’s Tipping
Point?, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28, 32 (2016).
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sanctions and harsh criminal penalties.”116 For Jill Fisch, this
lawmaking partnership provides more than political insulation
for Congress.117 An iterative and responsive lawmaking
partnership “is well positioned to respond to the dynamic
structure of the securities markets and the evolution of
information flow due to changes in technology and market
participants.”118
But flexibility can go hand-in-hand with a lack of clarity,
and many commentators question whether market participants
have appropriate notice about what conduct is subject to
enforcement.119 To be sure, there is a broad general consensus
about the “heartland” of insider trading.120 Many cases fit
comfortably within existing doctrines.121 It is at the boundaries
where problems arise. In these areas, scholars have highlighted
a host of anomalies and inconsistencies that could lead to
inconsistent and overbroad enforcement. And uncertainty
abounds over whether these marginal cases represent the bulk,
or even a substantial minority, of enforcement output.
A common critique involves the definition of materiality, an
area where the SEC and courts have never been willing to create
bright-line rules.122 Some commentators worry that enforcers

116. Id.
117. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 470–71; Langevoort, supra note 59, at
1340 (“[Leaving] hard issues open to ad hoc judicial resolution is a good way
to avoid (or at least defer) costly political confrontation.”).
118. Fisch, supra note 98, at 484; see Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of
Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1563–64 (2008) (arguing that broad
statutes can be used to respond to criminal innovation).
119. See Buell, supra note 118, at 1547 (arguing that broad standards can
result in a lack of clarity for market participants).
120. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading
after United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 228 (1999) (arguing that
the evolution of insider trading law has nothing to do with the heart of it).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2014);
United States v. Tinghui Xie, 942 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2019).
122. See Langevoort, supra note 59, at 1338 (describing Congress’s
decision to forego a definition of “materiality” even after it was recommended
by the American Law Institute).
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could exploit imprecise materiality standards to bolster their
enforcement statistics.123
To the extent that there are uncertainties in insider trading
doctrine and enforcers exercise insufficient prosecutorial
discretion, the resulting difficulties will be most acute in
criminal cases. Many commentators and scholars argue that
insider trading cases represent a classic case of prosecutorial
overreach, a misuse of criminal processes to penalize what are
at most fiduciary breaches.124 Rather than acting through the
usual rulemaking checks and balances or through the politically
accountable legislative process, enforcers pursue “regulation by
enforcement,”125 and define insider trading doctrine
haphazardly or in ways that maximize the interests of enforcers.
Commentators worry—particularly in times of economic
turmoil—that vague criminal liability standards will
“embolden[] prosecutors to push the law beyond established
boundaries.”126 And they suggest that novel theories the SEC
pursues in civil cases will bleed over into criminal
prosecutions.127
These due process concerns have centered recently on
liability standards for remote tippees, individuals who receive a
123. See Lemos, supra note 25, at 955 (“Enforcers likewise may be anxious
to please their overseers with impressive statistics of cases won and
settlements secured.”).
124. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 703, 713–14 (2005) (“[I]t encompasses a broad array of issues, including:
what should be denominated as a crime and when it should be enforced; who
falls within the law’s strictures or, conversely, avoids liability altogether; and
what should be the boundary.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean
“Criminal”? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 202 (1991) (“[F]ew legal categories seem
inherently less ‘criminal’ in character than the civil law applicable to fiduciary
duties or to the use of economic duress in negotiations.”).
125. See Lemos, supra note 25, at 949–50. For analyses focusing
specifically on the SEC, see ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION:
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 102
(1982); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by
Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 156–57
(1990).
126. J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States
v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (2015).
127. See Pritchard, supra note 32, at 62.

REAL INSIDER TRADING

1667

tip not directly from an insider but from another tippee. 128 Other
scholars worry that the SEC pursues an ever-expansive
definition of duties under the misappropriation theory.129
Rather than focusing on employment relationships or other
traditional fiduciary duties, critics point to cases where the SEC
has found duties of trust and confidence in family relationships,
friendships, and in other unusual relationships—unusual, that
is, in terms of established common law duties. 130 The farther
afield enforcers search for remote tippees, the more expansively
they define duties, and the less notice individuals will
presumably have that their conduct violated Rule 10b-5.
This lack of notice about the scope of liability is a perennial
issue.131 Justice Scalia argued in Whitman v. United States,132
that the Court was not required to defer to either a prosecutor’s
or the SEC’s interpretation of the scope of insider trading
liability.133 He signaled a willingness to carve back on the
breadth of insider trading doctrine through the rule of lenity.134
While the Court recently upheld a reasonably broad
interpretation of tipper liability,135 questions remain about the

128. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 483.
129. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary
Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1189, 1243–45 (1995).
130. See Painter, supra note 120, at 176–77.
131. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980) (“[A]
judicial holding that certain undefined activities ‘generally are prohibited’ by
§ 10(b) would raise questions whether either criminal or civil defendants
would be given fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity.”); United
States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (claiming that this
prosecution deprived Willis of due process of law because the law was “too
unclear . . . to provide him with fair notice that his conduct was illegal”); see
also Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider
Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 183–84 (1991); (“The litigation history
of insider trading reveals fundamental disagreement over the rationale behind
the prohibition as well as its scope.”); Painter, supra note 120, at 210
(discussing how a fiduciary may receive information outside of their fiduciary
relationship and be unsure of whether they can trade on that information).
132. 574 U.S. 1003 (2014).
133. Id. at 1003, 1005.
134. Id.
135. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016).
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overlap between criminal and civil enforcement.136 Indeed,
recent enforcement efforts have sought to avoid some of the
definitional landmines that have arisen under Rule 10b-5 by
pursuing insider trading prosecution under a broad, but
infrequently used, securities fraud provision in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.137
III. Incentives and Enforcement Choices
Enforcement is policymaking.138 Whether in the civil or
criminal context, enforcers shape the law when they make
choices about which cases to pursue and which to drop.139 They
regularly make decisions about enforcement strategy, choosing
to emphasize particular kinds of violations or focusing efforts on
particular industries.140 Those priorities shift not only from
administration to administration141 but from one enforcement
official to the next. 142 Enforcers exercise largely unreviewable
discretion in deciding what and how to charge.143 In a world
where most cases settle, they act as both enforcer and

136. See Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113,
2142–43 (2015) (describing overlapping enforcement authority, which could
include those in the Department of Justice with those in other executive
agencies).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266; see United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19,
30–34 (2d Cir. 2019) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1348); Karen E. Woody,
The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 614–17 (2020) (discussing
increasing use of § 1348).
138. See Lemos, supra note 25, at 947–49.
139. Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 41 (2017) (“[T]he most
critical determinant of the functional rules that actually govern primary
conduct will be the executive’s conscious, prospective choices of which laws to
enforce vigorously.”).
140. Id.
141. Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential
Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 198 (1982).
142. See Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce the
Law: A Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1534 (2018)
(explaining that the views of agency officials do not reflect the views of the
agency, since practices are not monolithic).
143. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV.
125, 183 (2008).
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adjudicator,144 deciding what punishments are warranted by
what conduct, only sporadically subject to meaningful judicial
oversight.145 Insider trading enforcement is no exception.
Indeed, given the vague statutory language, questions
regarding how law on the books translates into law in action
assume even greater importance. Evidence of regular
enforcement overreach would be cause for significant concern.
But claims about overly broad interpretation of vague
insider trading proscriptions do not match up well with broader
academic critiques of securities enforcement, which tend to
paint a picture of timid government authorities looking to
inflate their enforcement statistics.146 Rather than pursuing
complicated and uncertain cases, critics argue the SEC has
strong institutional incentives to pursue low-level targets
engaged in obvious wrongdoing.147 In these accounts,
enforcement discretion is largely a principal-agent problem,
with the agent (the SEC) maximizing its own interests over
those of the principal (the general public).148 If the principal
cannot perfectly monitor the agent, the agent has an incentive
to choose sub-optimal enforcement strategies that create the
appearance of competent and vigorous performance.149 Agencies
may, for example, select a portfolio of cases that yields the

144. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871
(2009).
145. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir.
2012).
146. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 33, at 876 (“As applied to public
enforcement, the upshot is that agencies seeking to build reputations as
effective enforcers will tend to emphasize easily measurable accomplishments
rather than more amorphous forms of success.”).
147. See Macey, supra note 33, at 646 (“Because investigations take time,
the SEC focuses on bringing cases that do not require much, if any,
investigation.”).
148. See Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability,
6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 194–202 (2014).
149. See id. at 195.
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highest win rate and the most actions filed, even if deterrence
might be better served by choosing a different mix of cases.150
It is not hard to see evidence of principal-agent problems in
the SEC’s enforcement program. Whenever questions arise
about the Commission’s legitimacy or competence, SEC officials
reliably tout the number of enforcement actions they bring and
the aggregate amount of fines and penalties they collect.151 Of
course, those metrics do not reveal much about the quality of
the SEC’s enforcement program, but when those totals exceed
the year before, Congress seems more inclined to accede to its
budget requests.152 As Johnathan Macey has noted, this creates
an incentive at the Commission to pursue cases that are likely
to settle quickly.153 The staff even has a name for those
actions—“stats point” cases.154 Viewed in this light, the recent
broken windows rhetoric might be little more than an attempt
to justify an enforcement program designed to inflate statistics
and to create a veneer of vigorous enforcement. Although the
SEC claims to devote considerable time and effort to
investigating insider trading claims,155 the current structure of
congressional oversight should incentivize it to target cases
where the necessary investigation is minimal because much of
the legwork has already been undertaken or because liability is
so obvious.156
But the preference for quick settlements might be as much
about resource constraints as it is about disguising
underperformance. The SEC’s resource constraints have been
150. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 33, at 876 (explaining that there
are strong incentives for agencies to focus on win rates and other quantifiable
objectives).
151. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the
SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 906 (2016).
152. Id.
153. See Macey, supra note 33, at 646.
154. See KOLHATKAR, supra note 37, at 153.
155. See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006), https://perma.cc/BWP6-UG8B
[hereinafter Testimony Concerning Insider Trading] (statement of Linda
Chatman Thomsen, Director, Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n)
(highlighting “the ingenuity and perseverance of our staff, and the lengths to
which we will go in tracing a fraud”).
156. See Macey, supra note 33, at 646.
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well documented,157 and are particularly acute with respect to
the agency’s capacity to try cases.158 Trial attorneys make up
only 10 percent of the non-supervisory enforcement staff.159 The
SEC has traditionally done a poor job of coordinating the work
of its investigative and trial attorneys, with some reports
suggesting an often dysfunctional relationship between the
groups.160 An enforcement agency operating under these
limitations could easily choose to concentrate on matters that
are likely to settle.161
Individual SEC enforcement attorneys and prosecutors are
subject to their own agency costs, and these incentives have
likewise figured prominently in the academic literature. The
most simplistic explanation is the familiar “revolving door”
argument, in which SEC officials take a light touch with
regulated entities in order to increase their chances for lucrative
post-government employment.162 The crude version of that
157. James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 757–60 (2003); Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis:
Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan.
9, 2014), https://perma.cc/GW5L-UGRL.
158. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND
UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 2 (2009),
https://perma.cc/JQ6L-5YVM (PDF) (“[B]oth management and staff said
resource challenges have delayed cases, reduced the number of cases that can
be brought, and potentially undermined the quality of some cases.”).
159. See id. at 18.
160. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: IMPROVING PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IS CRITICAL FOR AGENCY’S
EFFECTIVENESS 36 (2013), https://perma.cc/26PR-WR6T (PDF) (“Although the
agency has taken efforts to improve its intra-agency communication and
collaboration, staff continued to identify barriers to effective communication
and collaboration among the divisions, within the divisions, and between staff
and management, contrary to collaborative best practices.”).
161. See Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 305, 311 (1972) (“[A] perfectly rational, utility-maximizing
administrative agency will devote a ‘disproportionate’ amount of its resources
to relatively minor cases.”).
162. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 507, 507. But see Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2015) (asserting an alternative to the rent-seeking
model and stating that the relevant research “either finds no conclusive
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hypothesis is almost surely inaccurate because prosecutors and
SEC enforcement officials often make their names by taking on
and winning high-profile cases.163 Rather than rent-seeking,
many attorneys choose government employment to develop
saleable skills and a reputation for legal ability, judgment, and
success that will make them valuable in the private sector.164
While high-profile cases entail substantial potential
rewards, they also present substantial risks to this human
capital investment. As Samuel Buell notes, “no rational,
ambitious lawyer . . . wants to be known as the Captain Ahab of
prosecutors, the one who foolishly went after the biggest quarry
but failed to land it.”165 The higher the defendant’s profile, the
more resources he or she brings to the defense, the greater risk
of loss the case entails. High-profile defendants in insider
trading cases often have the financial resources to litigate
aggressively and at length and to retain the most skilled defense
counsel available.166 They often leverage their personal
evidence of a capture effect or finds evidence of an opposite effect that the
revolving door indeed results in more aggressive, not less aggressive,
regulatory actions”).
163. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 812 (1998)
(noting that lawyers in U.S. Attorney’s Offices often try to advance their
careers through “conspicuous litigation victories against well-represented
targets”); Rakoff, supra note 157 (“[W]hatever small influence the ‘revolving
door’ may have in discouraging certain white-collar prosecutions is more than
offset, at least in the case of prosecuting high-level individuals, by the
career-making benefits such prosecutions confer on the successful
prosecutor.”).
164. See Ed deHaan et al., The Revolving Door and the SEC’s Enforcement
Outcomes: Initial Evidence from Civil Litigation, 60 J. ACCT. & ECON. 65,
66–68 (2015) (asserting that attorneys who left the SEC to join firms
specializing in defending SEC enforcement actions were associated with more
aggressive enforcement actions at the SEC); Richard T. Boylan, What Do
Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 379, 396 (2005) (stating that successful U.S. attorneys are more
likely to become federal judges or partners in a large private practice later in
their careers).
165. SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 189 (2016).
166. See Walter Pavlo, The High Cost of Mounting a White-Collar
Criminal Defense, FORBES (May 30, 2013, 7:39 AM), https://perma.cc/K96SP44Z.
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resources through director and officer liability policies or
indemnification provisions, which typically require insurers or
the company to advance defense costs. 167 These defendants are
likely to attract substantial media attention, magnifying the
potential reputational gains or losses.168 By capitalizing on
these factors, defense attorneys can act as a significant check on
overly aggressive enforcement efforts.
These advantages accrue before, during, and after trial.
Defense lawyers can control and monitor information flows to
prosecutors during the investigative phase of a case.169 Through
“conference room litigation”170 they can meet with prosecutors
or use Wells submissions to persuade enforcers that the legal
theories or evidence are too weak to support a claim or that they
support only a civil one.171 Defendants will have both the
incentives and the resources to pursue every avenue of appeal
should they lose at trial.
These factors suggest a strong selection effect in
enforcement decisions and a potential inverse relationship
between the high-profile nature of the case or the defendant and
167. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE
MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION 42–76 (2010); see also XL Specialty Ins. v. Level Global Invs., L.P.,
874 F. Supp. 2d 263, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that once an insurer’s
duty to pay arises, “under a directors and officers liability policy calling for the
reimbursement of defense expenses . . . ‘insurers are required to make
contemporaneous interim advances of defense expenses’” (quoting Fed. Ins. v.
Kozlowski, 792 N.Y.S.2d 397, 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005))).
168. See Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schulman, When Talk is Not
Cheap: Communications with the Media, the Government and Other Parties in
High Profile White Collar Criminal Cases, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2002)
(“By definition, media will be involved to some extent in any high-profile
case.”).
169. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 1613, 1631 (2007).
170. Buell, supra note 36, at 885.
171. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES:
WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 99 (1991) (“Early legal
strategies may include negotiations with the agencies involved, the seeking of
civil or out-of-court resolution of the case, and the trading of information in
return for favorable treatment from the prosecutor’s office.”); Gerard E. Lynch,
Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2125–29 (1998) (explaining how skilled defense attorneys can influence a
prosecutor’s legal conclusions through “the power of persuasion”).
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the strength of the evidence or novelty of the legal theories. All
things being equal, rational enforcement attorneys should view
cases against high-profile, well-resourced targets as high
risk-reward investments. On average, it should only be rational
for risk-averse attorneys to pursue them when the evidence of
liability or guilt is overwhelming and when the legal standards
are certain.
An example is the recent prosecution of Rajat Gupta.172
Gupta, a member of the Goldman Sachs board, learned that
Warren Buffet was about to make a substantial investment in
the company.173 Coming in the middle of the financial crisis,
there was a high probability that the vote of confidence from
Buffett would lift the company’s stock price.174 A minute after
the board meeting ended, Gupta telephoned his friend, hedge
fund founder Raj Rajaratnam, who purchased several hundred
thousand shares of Goldman stock. 175 The FBI had previously
wiretapped Rajaratnam’s phone, and the next day he was heard
bragging that he had received a call “saying something good’s
gonna happen” at Goldman.176 After he was indicted, Gupta
mounted a vigorous defense, spending by some accounts nearly
$30 million, most of it funded by Goldman.177 He was convicted
and has lost multiple appeals.178 But given the clear evidence
and absence of novel legal issues, the case represented precisely
the kind of high-profile matter enforcers should be willing to
undertake.
Prominent past failures are likely to weigh heavily on the
minds of enforcement officials choosing whether to pursue
high-profile targets.179 In the language of behavioral economics,
they will be very available and thus over-weighted in calculating
172. See United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014).
173. See id. at 117.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 128.
177. See Peter Lattman, Goldman Stuck with a Defense Tab, and Awaiting
a Payback, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2012, 8:35 PM), https://perma.cc/4VSWTA4V.
178. See Gupta v. United States, 913 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2019).
179. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990).
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probabilities.180 The counterexample to Gupta is the SEC’s
failed enforcement action against Mark Cuban.181 The SEC
alleged that Cuban, a minority stockholder in an internet
start-up, learned from the company’s CEO about an impending
PIPE transaction, which would cause the company’s stock price
to decline.182 Cuban allegedly acknowledged that he could not
sell his stock before the deal was announced but did so
anyway.183
Unlike the case against Gupta, where it was clear that a
director owed a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of
MNPI, it was far from certain that a simple breach of a
confidentiality agreement was enough for liability.184 Nor was it
even certain that such an agreement existed.185 After a four-year
investigation, the SEC nonetheless filed an enforcement action
and spent the next five years litigating it.186 Cuban mounted a
vigorous defense, hiring a leading securities attorney and
reportedly spending more in legal fees than the estimated
potential fines he would have incurred had he settled. 187 The
district court originally dismissed the complaint, only to have
the Fifth Circuit reverse.188 A jury ultimately found Cuban not
liable.189 That outcome was widely reported in the media, as
were Cuban’s claims that the SEC tried to “bully” him into
settlement.190 Cuban’s complaints led to an internal

180. See id.
181. See generally SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
182. Id. at 552.
183. Id.
184. See Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider,
36 J. CORP. L. 343, 363 (2011).
185. See Cuban, 620 F.3d at 552.
186. See Jana J. Pruet, Billionaire Mark Cuban Cleared of Insider
Trading; Blasts U.S. Government, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:44 PM),
https://perma.cc/5L97-EVKA (PDF).
187. See id.
188. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558.
189. Pruet, supra note 186.
190. See id.
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investigation of the attorneys.191 High-profile failures like this
one can reasonably be expected to cause enforcers to take a
cautious approach to prominent targets, especially in cases
where the evidence is not overwhelming or where the legal
theory is untested.
Indeed, a 2013 Government Accountability Office study
reported precisely this kind of risk-averse environment at the
SEC.192 Contrary to Jill Fisch’s view about the benefits of the
law-making partnership in insider trading, cautious agency
personnel often chose not to pursue “cases that address evolving
market practices or developments with little precedent . . . .”193
Layers of review slowed cases and “created an atmosphere of
fear and insecurity, and may have created incentives for staff to
drop cases or narrow the scope of review.” 194 A majority of
surveyed SEC employees agreed that a “fear of public scandals
has made the SEC overly cautious and risk averse.” 195 A 2010
report by the SEC Office of Inspector General came to similar
conclusions, finding that the “arduous process of getting the
SEC staff’s approval in Washington, DC to recommend an
Enforcement action” led staff to “focus on easier cases, the ‘quick
hits.’”196
These dynamics create a quite different risk-return
calculation for lower profile targets. With fewer resources to
litigate and perhaps lower stakes, these defendants will face
greater pressure to settle. 197 Indeed, these defendants are in a
position far closer to that facing the typical street criminal than
191. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., ALLEGATIONS OF
ENFORCEMENT STAFF MISCONDUCT IN INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATION 82–89
(2011) https://perma.cc/CR8A-THW3 (PDF).
192. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 160, at 15 (“[S]enior
officers and staff surveyed remarked that recent enforcement failures and
related, sustained criticism . . . has contributed to their unwillingness to take
risk and innovate.”).
193. Id. at 17.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 16 tbl.5.
196. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION OF
THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S
ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 124, 129 (2010), https://perma.cc/7UHX-AF2J (PDF).
197. See Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure
on White-Collar Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 860 (2009).
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the well-resourced white collar one. Aggressive enforcement
tactics are less risky in these cases because they are unlikely to
garner significant media attention. Under these circumstances,
enforcers might be willing to pursue more novel interpretations
of legal standards, which may rarely be tested in court if these
cases settle disproportionately. Although civil settlements or
plea agreements have no precedential value, critics worry that
settlements involving novel legal theories will nonetheless shift
liability standards.198 The net effect will be an incremental
broadening of insider trading doctrine.
This risk-reward relationship is reinforced by the biases
and heuristics of individual enforcement attorneys. Myopic loss
aversion and narrow framing can lead individuals acting within
organizations to be overly cautious in the initiatives they
undertake.199 The SEC opens around one thousand
investigations a year, each of which is best viewed as a risky
capital investment project.200 On an agency wide scale, the SEC
should have strong incentives to include some risky, high-profile
cases in its portfolio. Not all of them will succeed, but those that
do can be expected to have a strong deterrent effect.201 Even if
the probability of getting caught for insider trading is low,
high-profile prosecutions will be very available to market
participants. The ease of recalling these cases may lead them to
overestimate probabilities of a successful enforcement action,
enhancing the SEC’s deterrence goals. Leveraging the
availability heuristic not only provides a rationale for bringing
high-profile cases likely to draw media attention, it also justifies
crackdowns, which have a similar effect.202 These factors help
198. See Matthew C. Turk, Regulation by Settlement, 66 U. KAN. L. REV.
259, 260–61 (2017).
199. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold
Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 18–24
(1993).
200. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT: 2019
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2019), https://perma.cc/Y937-8X8L (PDF).
201. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538 (1998) (explaining how making law
enforcement highly visible can deter crime because “individuals tend to judge
the likelihood of certain events (such as getting caught for a crime) by how
available such instances are to the human mind”).
202. See Sohoni, supra note 139, at 33.
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explain the SEC’s penchant for insider trading cases involving
public figures or unusual or entertaining facts, which are likely
to appeal to reporters.
Individual enforcement attorneys likely have a different
calculus. If on average enforcement attorneys weigh potential
losses more heavily than potential gains, they will have strong
incentives to take on only cases that they believe have a strong
likelihood of winning.203 Defense attorneys can exploit this
natural loss aversion by focusing on the potential weaknesses in
the government’s case. For example, government attorneys
apparently re-evaluated their decision to bring charges against
Steven Cohen after defense counsel’s exhaustive analysis of the
weaknesses in the government’s evidence.204
Enforcers may anticipate these problems before they arise,
leading to wholesale shifts in which cases they choose to
investigate. Government attorneys unwilling to take too many
risks (or speculating that the risks of pursuing large,
high-profile cases will be insuperable) may not even try, shifting
their efforts to investigating and settling many small cases.
Shirking agents may pursue easy cases or those in which much
of the investigative work has already occurred. This is likely a
bigger problem for career enforcers, but even those looking to
return to the private sector might be drawn to these matters.
Small cases may not have as much potential to enhance their
reputations but investigating and settling them could still
signal to future employers that the attorney possesses
substantial skills, all without the risk of a high-profile failure.
The pressure to choose the least risky option does not
diminish (and may in fact intensify) where probabilities of
success are difficult to assess ex ante and where supervisors will
review the individual’s decisions frequently under less than
certain metrics.205 If the results of investigations were
aggregated and attorneys’ overall success rate was the only
measure of performance, attorneys might be willing to take
203. See Kahneman et al., supra note 179, at 1326.
204. See KOLHATKAR, supra note 37, at 239–44 (detailing Cohen’s
attorneys’ strategy to focus “on the government’s weak spot: its crippling fear
of losing a big case”).
205. See Richard H. Thaler et al., The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion
of Risk Taking: An Experimental Test, 112 Q. J. ECON. 647, 648 (1997).
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greater risks. But it will be difficult for the Commission to send
credible signals to its employees that investigations that do not
lead to an enforcement action or that lead to a Commission loss
will not count against them.206 Indeed, since supervisors will
view staff attorneys’ decisions in hindsight, there is a
substantial risk that they will attribute those outcomes to either
poor decision-making or poor lawyering. The risk of hindsight
bias will push attorneys toward cases that seem obvious at the
outset. This will especially be so when the attorney who took the
risky case is viewed in the context of her more conservative
colleagues. In a world where the convention is to make the safe
choice, blame for excessive risk taking is more likely for the
individual bucking that norm.207
Are government officials timid enforcers who are only
willing to pursue clear-cut and obvious cases of insider trading
or aggressive ones who regularly stretch the bounds of legal
doctrine to bring unwarranted claims? Who are the targets of
those cases? Are they the market elites of popular rhetoric or
are do they tend to be less well-resourced and lower profile
traders? Do market participants have sufficient notice of the
kinds of behavior that lead to civil or criminal charges?
Answering these questions without hard empirical data is
difficult because enforcers are subject to a wide variety of
incentives, which in many cases work at cross purposes.
Focusing on just one incentive in isolation (for example, the
desire for individual enforcers to build human capital) might
lead to a prediction that attorneys will aggressively pursue
high-profile insider trading cases with novel legal theories.
Picking others (such as institutional incentives to maximize
enforcement statistics and individual loss aversion) might lead
to the opposite prediction.
In the current, largely anecdotal debate, it has been easy to
cherry pick individual cases of prosecutorial overreach, cases of
206. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 160, at 36
(explaining that during the time period under study, SEC employees had low
morale, a high distrust of management, and expressed concerns about the
uncertain link between their actual and rated performance).
207. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 347 (2011)
(demonstrating that judgmental observers tend to assign more blame to the
habitual risktaker than non-risktakers).
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obvious but comparatively minor wrongdoing that settle
quickly, or cases that articulated an aggressive vision of some
element of an insider trading claim. But to properly evaluate
how enforcement actually operates requires a more systematic
analysis of which cases prosecutors and the SEC actually bring
and how those cases are resolved.
IV.

The Dataset

To analyze real insider trading, I compiled a hand-collected
sample of insider trading cases filed in SEC fiscal years 2011 to
2015 (October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2015). Cases were
identified using the SEC’s Select SEC and Market Data report,
which lists enforcement actions organized by type.208 As Urska
Velikonja’s research has demonstrated, however, these reports
are highly unreliable for identifying the true level of SEC
enforcement activity because the SEC is inconsistent in how it
structures its actions.209 In some cases, it names all individuals
in a single civil complaint or administrative proceeding; in
others, it files separate actions against each defendant.210
Inconsistencies abound in how the SEC classifies its cases. 211
To avoid these inconsistencies the unit of analysis in this
study is the individual defendant.212 For each defendant
identified in an SEC enforcement action, I collected data to
determine whether that same defendant was the subject of a
parallel criminal action.213 Any additional defendants named in
criminal actions that were not previously identified in SEC
actions were added to the database. For a case to be included,
there had to be an insider trading claim. Thus, an
208. See Reports and Publications, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/G97W-872H (listing enforcement actions).
209. Velikonja, supra note 151, at 950.
210. See id.
211. See id. (explaining that case categorization is within the discretion of
the enforcement staff at the first instance, and then reviewed by the Office of
the Secretary, which can lead to inconsistencies in categorization from year to
year).
212. Relief defendants were excluded from the analysis.
213. Criminal enforcement actions were identified in a number of ways,
including searches for Department of Justice press releases, media articles,
and docket searches.
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administrative failure to supervise claim and criminal
indictments alleging obstruction of justice were not included in
the sample.214 I also omitted cases against unknown purchasers
of securities, which typically seek to freeze assets, but do not
allege enough details about the underlying claim for proper
analysis.
Members of the same insider trading network might be
sued or indicted over a multi-year period. To ensure that each
member of a network was included in the dataset, I added any
cases filed before FY 2011 and after FY 2015 if they involved
insider trading episodes enforced during the study period.215
The earliest cases in the dataset are thus from FY 2008. Every
effort was made to identify all insider trading cases; there is no
evidence that the data collection methodology biased the sample
in any way. The case selection process yielded a total of 465
defendants in the dataset.
The database compiles three categories of information
regarding each defendant: (1) litigation characteristics; (2)
defendant characteristics; and (3) the nature of the allegations.
Litigation specific information, such as filing dates and
outcomes, were collected for each identified proceeding.
A more detailed description of the variables analyzed
appears in the data appendix. Insider trading enforcement can
occur in three forums: (1) criminal enforcement in federal court;
(2) civil enforcement in the same venue; and (3) proceedings
brought before administrative law judges (ALJs).216 Cases with
214. See, e.g., Indictment at 3–4, United States v. McClellan, 10-cr-00860
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010), ECF No. 1 (indictment for obstruction of justice).
215. Earlier cases were not included in the sample if the only action in the
study period was a follow-on administrative proceeding against a regulated
person. See, e.g., Holzer, Exchange Act Release No. 63822, 2011 SEC LEXIS
595 (Feb. 2, 2011).
216. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 11-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78t(e)) (empowering the SEC to obtain civil penalties against
non-regulated persons in administrative proceedings). The use of ALJs and
the shift of traditional civil enforcement actions to administrative proceedings
have been controversial. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018)
(finding method for appointing ALJs unconstitutional); see generally Stephen
J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An
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some sort of criminal enforcement make up 39.8 percent of the
sample.217 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample
and shows significant differences between cases with and
without criminal enforcement.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Civil
Enforcement
Only
(n = 280)

Criminal
Enforcement

pvalue

(n = 185)

A. Litigation Characteristics
FINRA
No
Yes
FBI
No
Yes
ORSA
No
Yes
SEC Market Abuse
No
Yes
Lag (Days)
Case Length (Days)
Enforcement Type
Civil
Criminal

0.068
110 (41.0%)
158 (59.0%)

92 (49.7%)
93 (50.3%)

210 (78.4%)
58 (21.6%)

42 (22.7%)
143 (77.3%)

201 (75.0%)
67 (25.0%)

116 (62.7%)
69 (37.3%)

<0.001

0.005

0.005
227 (84.7%)
41 (15.3%)
1180.450 (566)
250.656 (410)

137 (74.1%)
48 (25.9%)
1064.708 (550)
625.285 (489)

221 (78.9%)
0 (0.0%)

0 (0.0%)
7 (3.8%)

0.033
<0.001
<0.001

Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2017); Alexander I. Platt, SEC
Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. LAW. 1 (2016).
Still, it is important to keep those controversies in perspective; defendants in
stand-alone administrative actions were less than 7 percent of all defendants.
See infra Table 1.
217. Defendants facing all three types of enforcement are overwhelmingly
(70.8 percent) SMPs. Most administrative proceedings are follow-on actions to
bar defendants from the securities industry or, for non-SMPs, to bar them from
appearing or practicing before the Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)
(2020).
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SEC Administrative
Civil and Criminal
Civil and Administrative
Civil Criminal
Administrative
Criminal and
Administrative

Civil
Enforcement
Only
29 (10.4%)
0 (0.0%)
30 (10.7%)

Criminal
Enforcement

pvalue

0 (0.0%)
112 (60.5%)
0 (0.0%)

0 (0.0%)

63 (34.1%)

0 (0.0%)

3 (1.6%)

36 (12.9%)
41 (14.6%)
32 (11.4%)
5 (1.8%)
20 (7.1%)
125 (44.6%)
21 (7.5%)

12 (6.5%)
30 (16.2%)
68 (36.8%)
8 (4.3%)
10 (5.4%)
52 (28.1%)
5 (2.7%)

B. Defendant Characteristics
Defendant Type
Officer & Director
Other Employee
SMP
Lawyer
Other Professional
Friends and Family
Other
Gender
Male
Female
Direct Profit (000s 2016
Dollars)
Downstream Profit (000s
2016 Dollars)

<0.001

0.051
261 (93.2%)
19 (6.8%)

180 (97.3%)
5 (2.7%)

1,105.62 (9195)

817.97 (2750)

0.68

1,555.37 (17235)

7,046.95 (24318)

0.005

88 (31.4%)
33 (11.8%)
102 (36.4%)
57 (20.4%)
2.600 (12)
3.929 (3)

13 (7.0%)
58 (31.4%)
49 (26.5%)
65 (35.1%)
5.098 (7)
7.432 (5)

C. Nature of Allegations
Basis of Liability
Trading
Tipping Only
Trading after Tip Only
Trading and Tipping
# of IT Events
Network Size
Security Traded

<0.001

0.010
<0.001
<0.001
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Common Shares
Options or Other
Derivatives
No Trading
Common Shares & Options
Concealment/Obstruction
No
Yes
Level
0
1
2
3
4
5
MNPI
Financial Information
M & A Activity
Product Approval
Other
Industry
Automotive
Aviation
Banking & Financial
Services
Biotechnology
Chemicals
Food & Beverage
Healthcare
Hospitality & Tourism
Insurance
IT & High Technology
Media
Medical Equipment
Metal Works
Mining
Oil & Gas
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Civil
Enforcement
Only
169 (60.4%)

Criminal
Enforcement

pvalue

64 (34.6%)

35 (12.5%)

26 (14.1%)

34 (12.1%)
42 (15.0%)

54 (29.2%)
41 (22.2%)

239 (85.4%)
41 (14.6%)

115 (62.2%)
70 (37.8%)

<0.001

0.012
99 (35.4%)
113 (40.4%)
55 (19.6%)
7 (2.5%)
5 (1.8%)
1 (0.4%)

52 (28.1%)
68 (36.8%)
41 (22.2%)
17 (9.2%)
7 (3.8%)
0 (0.0%)

44 (15.7%)
200 (71.4%)
13 (4.6%)
23 (8.2%)

54 (29.2%)
113 (61.1%)
10 (5.4%)
8 (4.3%)

1 (0.4%)
6 (2.1%)

3 (1.6%)
0 (0.0%)

17 (6.1%)

6 (3.2%)

46 (16.4%)
9 (3.2%)
13 (4.6%)
7 (2.5%)
13 (4.6%)
24 (8.6%)
62 (22.1%)
1 (0.4%)
17 (6.1%)
11 (3.9%)
3 (1.1%)
11 (3.9%)

39 (21.1%)
0 (0.0%)
1 (0.5%)
1 (0.5%)
2 (1.1%)
2 (1.1%)
82 (44.3%)
1 (0.5%)
16 (8.6%)
8 (4.3%)
0 (0.0%)
4 (2.2%)

0.003

<0.001
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Civil
Enforcement
Only
3 (1.1%)
7 (2.5%)
16 (5.7%)
1 (0.4%)
5 (1.8%)
1 (0.4%)
6 (2.1%)

Criminal
Enforcement

pvalue

Pharmaceuticals
1 (0.5%)
Property & Development
0 (0.0%)
Retail
3 (1.6%)
Shipping
5 (2.7%)
Telecommunications
2 (1.1%)
Apparel & Textiles
6 (3.2%)
Other
3 ( 1.6%)
Duty
0.46
N/A
205 (73.2%)
139 (75.1%)
Employment
32 (11.4%)
26 (14.1%)
Family Relationship
13 (4.6%)
2 (1.1%)
Friendship
7 (2.5%)
3 (1.6%)
Confidentiality Agreement 8 (2.9%)
4 (2.2%)
Traditional Fiduciary
12 (4.3%)
10 (5.4%)
Other
2 (0.7%)
1 (0.5%)
Unknown
1 (0.4%)
0 (0.0%)
Note: For sources and descriptions of variables, see data appendix. For
categorical data, parentheticals are percent of total. For continuous data,
parentheticals are standard deviations. Due to missing data, not all
categories total to 465.

V.

Materiality in Insider Trading Cases

To analyze the claim that enforcers stretch doctrinal
boundaries, I begin with the most rudimentary requirement of
any insider trading case. To prevail, enforcers must show the
defendant possessed MNPI. 218 Materiality is governed, for the
most part, by flexible, case-specific standards. Courts generally
define information as material if either “there is substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important” in buying or selling the security or if there is a
substantial likelihood that the information “would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly

218.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2020).
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altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” 219 When
that information is speculative or contingent, materiality
judgments require “a balancing of both the indicated probability
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity.” 220 Both the
SEC221 and courts222 have consistently rejected rules of thumb
and bright-line rules in favor of a fact-specific, case-by-case
assessment.223
Insider trading critics argue that flexible standards create
substantial uncertainties for market participants224 and allow
enforcement officials to stretch the proper boundaries of insider
trading doctrine.225 The “lack of a clear and objective standard,”
John Anderson writes, “permits almost any information to be
deemed material for purposes of insider trading liability.”226
Professor Anderson suggests that the SEC has resisted efforts
219. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
220. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (citing SEC v. Tex.
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d. Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969)).
221. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug.
19, 1999) (rejecting the use of a 5 percent threshold in determining the
materiality of misstatements or omissions in financial statements).
222. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39–40 (2011)
(rejecting a bright-line rule that reports of adverse events associated with a
pharmaceutical company’s products cannot be material absent a statistically
significant risk that the product is causing the events); Basic, 485 U.S. at
237–39 (rejecting a bright-line rule that preliminary merger negotiations are
material only when the parties reach an agreement in principle).
223. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 (“Whether merger discussions in any
particular case are material . . . depends on the facts.”).
224. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of
Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2003)
[hereinafter Heminway, Materiality Guidance] (“[T]he imprecise existing legal
standard defining what is ‘material’ makes it difficult for those issuers,
directors and officers to understand their legal obligations.”).
225. See Peter J. Henning, What’s so Bad About Insider Trading Law?, 70
BUS. LAW. 751, 771–72 (2015) (arguing that the flexible materiality definition
“allows the prohibition to be applied to new types of data that have not been
subject to prosecutions before and to reach persons far removed from the
traditional corporate world”).
226. ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 62; see Henning, supra note 225, at 771
(claiming that “[j]ust about any nugget of information could conceivably fit”
the materiality definition).
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to clarify materiality because the current flexible standard
facilitates its enforcement efforts and those of prosecutors.227
Others have urged the Commission or judges to adopt safe
harbor provisions, bright-line rules, or presumptions to address
these uncertainties.228
Although commentators raise a host of objections, two
related problems are central to complaints about materiality.
The heart of the issue is the hindsight bias problem inherent to
all materiality determinations.229 Enforcers and ultimately
juries will only assess materiality if the information led to a
profitable trade.230 But what seems certain in hindsight may not
have been so clear when the trading decision occurred.231 Critics
also complain that courts bootstrap—that they infer materiality
from the fact of trading,232 effectively conflating materiality with
a separate element, the purchase or sale of a security.233
227. See ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 62 (“Such flexibility can be quite
useful to the SEC and prosecutors. Consequently, it should come as no
surprise that the SEC has openly resisted efforts to bring greater clarity to the
definition of materiality.”).
228. See Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 224, at 1135
(suggesting the “expanded use of per se rules, presumptions, and safe harbor
provisions”).
229. See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773,
788 (2004).
230. See id. at 774 (“Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and
mistake. People consistently overstate what could have been predicted after
events have unfolded . . . .”).
231. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 67
(2014) (discussing the importance of determining when the information in
question became material); see also Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the
Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62
BUS. LAW. 317, 323 (2007) (explaining the role of predictions in trading
decisions).
232. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d. Cir. 1968)
(en banc) (explaining that “a major factor in determining whether” information
is material “is the importance attached to the [information] by those who knew
about it,” and that an insider’s choice to trade alone can serve as an indication
of such importance).
233. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 231, at 68 (“If the allegedly illegal trade
proves that the information is material, the materiality requirement becomes
meaningless because all information in the defendant’s possession when he or
she traded would be material.”); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
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Is there evidence that these are widespread problems?
Critics largely focus on the possibility that enforcers could
exploit current standards, and there is no doubt that they are
right about that possibility. But there is little evidence enforcers
actually do so in practice.
As Table 2 shows, two types of MNPI dominate in the 465
insider trading cases in the dataset: (1) information about
impending M&A activity, which appears in two-thirds of
enforcement actions against individual defendants; 234 and (2)
financial information (typically unannounced quarterly results),
alleged in slightly more than 20 percent of cases. The only other
category that appears with any frequency is information about
product approvals or testing, usually information involving new
drug applications, which appears in about 5 percent of cases. In
total, over 93 percent of insider trading cases involve one of
these three categories of MNPI.
Table 2
Nature of MNPI
Overall

Non-Criminal

Criminal

M & A Activity
313
Financial Information 98

(67.31)
(21.08)

200
44

(71.43)
(15.71)

113
98

(67.31)
(21.08)

Product Approval

23

(4.95)

13

(4.64)

23

(4.95)

Other

31

(6.67)

823

(8.21)

31

(6.67)

Total

465

280

185

Note: For data definitions and sources see Data Appendix. Numbers in
parentheses are column percentages.

Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975) (providing that disclosure of material
information and the purchasing or selling a security are two separate elements
of insider trading).
234. Although these percentages have shifted over the years, there is a
remarkable consistency in the cases enforcers pursue. A study of SEC
enforcement actions in the 1980s found that nearly 80 percent involved M&A
activity, with another 8 percent focused on earnings information. Lisa K.
Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661,
1670 (1992).
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All three share an important characteristic—in the
majority of cases there is little doubt about materiality. In the
terminology of recent insider trading cases, they
overwhelmingly involved “black edge,” information that is
clearly material and nonpublic and which creates a substantial
risk of liability.235 These data are consistent with a theory of
enforcement risk aversion—cases involving obvious MNPI will
be far less risky to pursue. 236 Indeed, by focusing their efforts on
these cases, enforcers appear to have adopted in practice
precisely the constrained materiality standard that critics have
sought. Nor does this restricted view seem like a recent
phenomenon. As James Park has noted, some early insider
trading decisions focused their discussions of materiality on
information that was “extraordinary in nature” and “reasonably
certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the
security.”237
The three types of cases that predominate in insider trading
enforcement actions are discussed in greater detail below.238
A.

M&A Cases

Under
Basic’s
probability-magnitude
test,
M&A
transactions are usually significant events, especially for the
company being acquired, even if their probability is low. 239 For
235. See KOLHATKAR, supra note 37, at 106 (“If traders came into
possession of this sort of information, the stock should be restricted
immediately—at least in theory.”).
236. See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text.
237. James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory
Disclosure, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1133, 1183 (citing SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,
565 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1977)).
238. The cases in the Other category also generally involve clearly
material information. See, e.g., Geist, Exchange Act Release No. 73581, 2014
SEC LEXIS 4316 (Nov. 12, 2014) (award of U.S. Army contract); SEC Charges
Former BP Employee with Insider Trading During the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, Litigation Release No. 22975, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1352 (Apr. 17, 2014)
(extent of BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill).
239. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (“Since a merger
in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a small
corporation’s life . . . inside information . . . can become material at an earlier
stage than [it would in] lesser transactions . . . .” (quoting SEC v. Geon Indus.,
531 F.2d 39, 47–48 (1976)).
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82.7 percent of the defendants who traded on MNPI about an
impending transaction, the information in their possession
involved the company’s acquisition. In many of these cases, the
acquisition target was a relatively small public company being
acquired by a substantially larger one. The transaction typically
had advanced reasonably far, increasing the chances that it
would occur. In these circumstances, it was not difficult for the
defendants to anticipate a large price impact on disclosure.
These are not cases of materiality by hindsight.
The trading surrounding General Electric’s acquisition of
Vital Signs, Inc. provides a typical example. 240 In 2008, Vital
Signs was a medical equipment manufacturer with a market
capitalization of under $1 billion.241 A Vital Signs executive vice
president helped negotiate the acquisition and signed a
non-disclosure agreement.242 After the companies agreed on
terms, he tipped the acquisition price to his cousin, a registered
representative, who in turn tipped five others.243 Vital Signs’
stock price increased 26 percent on the day the deal was
announced.244 There was nothing uncertain about materiality in
this case. Numerous other enforcement actions are factually
similar.245

240. SEC Charges Eight Individuals with Making $450,000 from Insider
Trading in Vital Signs, Inc., Litigation Release No. 22205, 2011 SEC LEXIS
4498 (Dec. 21, 2011).
241. Scott Malone, GE to Acquire Vital Signs for $860 Million Cash,
REUTERS (July 24, 2008, 7:37 AM), https://perma.cc/2HQZ-2M6J (PDF).
242. Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Easom, No. 11-cv-7314 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2011),
ECF No. 1.
243. See id. ¶¶ 2–3.
244. See id. ¶ 2.
245. See, e.g., SEC Charges Five Physicians with Insider Trading in Stock
of Medical Professional Liability Insurer, Litigation Release No. 22413, 2012
SEC LEXIS 2135 (July 10, 2012) (chairman shared acquisition information
with family members and friends); SEC Charges Biotech Employee, Two
Stockbrokers with Insider Trading on Nonpublic Information About
Pharmaceutical Trials and Merger, Litigation Release No. 23279, 2015 SEC
LEXIS 2284 (June 9, 2015) (executive tipped brother-in-law about company’s
acquisition); SEC Charges Former Loan Officer with Oak Hill Financial, Inc.
and Three Others with Insider Trading, Litigation Release No. 22234, 2012
SEC LEXIS 237 (Jan. 24, 2012) (employee tipped friend about impending
acquisition).
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One reason that M&A cases predominate in enforcement
actions is because of the methods the SEC and SROs use to
detect insider trading. A substantial number of the SEC’s M&A
cases come from FINRA market surveillance, which operates
the Insider Trading Surveillance Group within its Office of
Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence (OFDMI).246 When
SROs identify cases with suspicious trading, they refer those
cases to the SEC for further potential investigation.247
While enforcement officials tend to be discreet regarding
the inner workings of their algorithms, available information
indicates that their analyses are typically tied to significant
corporate announcements.248 While any corporate event can
potentially be material, data surrounding M&A transactions is
often regarded by regulators as the most material and the most
likely to result in insider trading.249 FINRA opens investigations
after more than 90 percent of announced mergers.250 As it
describes the process: “When a major announcement comes out,
the OFDMI team can go back and see if the software picked up
any unusual movements in the stock prices of the companies
involved.”251 As a result, 65.9 percent of the cases involving
246. See Catching the Bad Guys: Inside FINRA’s Office of Fraud Detection
and Market Intelligence, FINRA (Sept. 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/5S2H-ZNWT
[hereinafter Catching the Bad Guys] (exploring the “inner workings” of
OFDMI); Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech:
All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust Use of Civil and Criminal Actions
to Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014), https://perma.cc/W7ZF-88PN (stating
that many insider trading cases start out as a referral from FINRA); see also
L. HILTON FOSTER, U.S. SEC, INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATIONS 3–4 (2000),
https://perma.cc/57WW-UDF2 (PDF) (reporting the sources of cases). All of
these investigators use data mining techniques to find suspicious trading
patterns.
247. See FOSTER, supra note 246, at 3 (“SROs provide the SEC with
hundreds of reports of suspicious trading each year.”).
248. Id. at 2.
249. Hawke Interview, supra note 53.
250. See Ben Protess, For Wall Street Watchdog, All Grunt Work, Little
Glory,
N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Dec.
1,
2011,
7:00
PM),
https://perma.cc/B3PP-KVGJ (discussing FINRA’s role in insider trading
prosecutions).
251. Catching the Bad Guys, supra note 246; see How FINRA’s
Surveillance Helped Score a Hole in One in “Golf Lingo” Insider Trading Case,
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M&A activity come, at least in part, from a tip from FINRA.
Enforcement officials necessarily evaluate materiality
retrospectively, but by limiting their surveillance efforts to
cases with these kinds of announcements, there seems to be
little risk that hindsight bias will color their materiality
judgments.
The materiality of the information at issue in the average
enforcement action is apparent from the market reaction when
the information is made public. Indeed, information about
forthcoming M&A announcements tends to be the most material
and, as such, typically receives the most attention from SEC
enforcement attorneys looking to build an insider trading
case.252 Even critics of insider trading enforcement agree that
such market reactions are the “most objective evidence of
materiality.”253 While the absence of a market reaction might be
due to a number of factors,254 a substantial market reaction is
strong evidence that the disclosed information is material.255
Much like securities class action attorneys, the SEC uses
market reaction as a screen in choosing which investigations to
pursue. Former enforcement officials report that the SEC
generally looks for cases with price movements of 10 percent or
more as a proxy for materiality.256 The existence of this kind of
screen is borne out in the data. Kenneth Ahern examined stock
returns in insider trading cases and found that enforcers tend
to focus on cases that exhibit large post-disclosure returns.257
Ahern found that enforcement cases involving corporate deals
FINRA (Jan. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/XVS5-7ND9 (explaining that after
algorithms detect unusual trading patterns before major corporate
announcements, investigators compile an “Identification List” of those who
placed suspicious trades).
252. Hawke Interview, supra note 53.
253. Sauer, supra note 231, at 323.
254. See generally Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic and Limits of Event Studies
in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553 (2018).
255. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000).
256. FOSTER, supra note 246, at 4.
257. Kenneth R. Ahern, Information Networks: Evidence from Illegal
Insider Trading Tips, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 26, 45 (2017); Patrick Augustin et al.,
Informed Option Trading Prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?, 65
MGMT. SCI. 5697, 5717 (2019) (showing a positive correlation between
cumulative abnormal return and the likelihood of a SEC enforcement action).
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had average returns of 34.9 percent over 21.3 trading days (the
length of time from the day following the first alleged tip to the
event date).258 Because M&A transactions take time to
negotiate, tips in those cases occur on average a month before
the public announcement.259 The average return over that
period was 43.1 percent.260 Although these cases often had
substantial pre-announcement run-ups, the mean (median)
announcement day returns were still substantial, 21.9 percent
(11.0 percent).261
It is important to emphasize that these data come from filed
cases. There may well be insider trading prior to transactions
that result in smaller market reactions. These cases may never
come to the attention of enforcement authorities. Even if they
do, enforcers may choose not to file actions because of concerns
about their ability to prove materiality. For present purposes, it
is enough to note that the screening processes enforcers use tend
to ensure that they will not typically bring cases involving
information of questionable materiality.262 In fact, these
258. Ahern, supra note 257, at 31–32.
259. Id. at 28.
260. Id. at 32.
261. See id. at tbl.1 (displaying the mean and median announcement day
returns for M&A corporate events).
262. Typically does not mean never. There are cases in the dataset in
which enforcers took aggressive materiality positions. A good example is the
enforcement action against Canadian investment banker Richard Moore. See
Complaint ¶ 10, SEC v. Moore, No. 13-cv-02514 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013), ECF
No. 1 (alleging insider trading against investment banker). One of Moore’s
primary clients was the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (the
“CPPIB). Id. ¶ 1. Moore had worked with his friend, a Managing Director of
CPPIB, on a number of transactions, and learned from him that CPPIB was
working on a potential acquisition. Id. The Managing Director provided Moore
with no material information about the acquisition target, but Moore learned
that he had been traveling to London in connection with the potential deal. Id.
¶ 19. At a charity event, Moore spotted the Managing Director with the CEO
of London-based Tompkins plc and surmised that it was the target. Id. ¶ 20.
Moore purchased Tompkins ADRs and made a profit of $163,293. SEC
Charges Former Investment Banker with Insider Trading, Litigation Release
No. 22674, 2013 SEC LEXIS 1120 (Apr. 16, 2013). Moore settled the action a
week later. Final Judgment as to Richard Bruce Moore at 2, SEC v. Moore,
No. 13-cv-02514 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013), ECF No. 3. Although Moore obtained
some confidential information, it is hard to see how it was material. Indeed,
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processes may create under- not over-enforcement. If
information is material but there is, for whatever reason, a more
muted market response when public disclosure occurs, then
significant insider trading may go undetected or unpunished.
Such a situation could arise, for example, when significant
tipping occurs after the initial trades, leading to a substantial
price run-up prior to announcement.263
B.

Financial Information Cases

Cases based on financial information were prominent parts
of the recent crackdown involving hedge funds and expert
networks.264 Indeed, as shown in Table 1 there is a significantly
higher proportion of financial information cases involving
criminal (29.2 percent) as opposed to exclusively civil
enforcement (15.7 percent). Not surprisingly, these cases derive
more frequently from FBI investigations (56.3 percent) rather
than from FINRA surveillance (25.0 percent).
The majority of these cases involve short-term
developments from which a trader could derive a definitive
prediction about the direction and size of the company’s stock
price.265 As James Park has noted, trading on this kind of
information undermines the integrity of the mandatory
disclosure system.266 Often the information in these cases
involves quarterly financial results or other information with a

this appears to be the classic situation in which a “skilled analyst with
knowledge of the company and the industry may piece seemingly
inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic which
reveals material non-public information.” Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635
F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980). While this seems quite clearly to be an aggressive
interpretation, this kind of case is the exception rather than the rule.
263. See Ahern, supra note 257, at 44 (stating that insider trading profits
decrease as the length of the tipping chain increases).
264. See infra Table 1; see also Benjamin Bain, Hedge Fund Woes After
U.S. Crackdown Don’t Surprise SEC’s Chair, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2016)
https://perma.cc/47KS-T4KJ (describing the large number of recent
convictions as a “golden era for insider trading”).
265. See Park, supra note 237, at 1164–65 (stating that release of financial
records has short-term implications for a company’s value).
266. Id. at 1136.
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high probability of affecting the company’s stock price.267
Consider, for example, the case against Steven Dombrowski,
who worked in a corporate audit department.268 He learned that
his company’s first quarter results were worse than expected
and that the company would miss its earnings target.269 In
violation of the company’s insider trading policy, Dombrowski
sold his stock short and bought put options through his wife’s
brokerage account.270 He profited substantially when the stock
dropped 35.7 percent on the news.271
There is little doubt about the materiality of this kind of
information, especially in situations like this one where results
were out of line with market expectations.272 These trades or
tips generally occurred over a short timeframe—just 11.3 days
in Ahern’s study.273 Because this information is subject to
mandatory reporting obligations and disclosed quarterly, there
is little policy justification for permitting tipping and trading on
it because those activities do almost nothing to improve
allocative efficiency. As Judge Easterbrook and Professor
Fischel have noted, quarterly earnings provide great
opportunities for profitable trading, but trading “on news that
is bound to come out anyway does not change the future or lead
to better investment in new securities.”274 The stock price will
ultimately change when the company files.275 “That it changes a
day or so quicker is not of much moment for allocative

267. Id. at 1139.
268. Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Dombrowski, No. 14-cv-00622 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
28, 2014), ECF No. 1.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. ¶¶ 39–42.
272. See Bradford Cornell & Wayne R. Landsman, Security Price Response
to Quarterly Earnings Announcements and Analysts’ Forecast Revisions, 64
ACCT. REV. 680, 680 (1989) (“To the extent that earnings announcements are
unanticipated, they are likely to provide new information about future cash
flow and, thus, to alter the value of the firm.”).
273. Ahern, supra note 257, at 32 tbl.1.
274. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 288 (1996).
275. Id.
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efficiency.”276 Bringing cases based on this kind of MNPI is well
within existing legal doctrines.
The salience of the information in these cases also derives
from the industries in which trading is concentrated. Two
industries—High Technology and, to a lesser degree
Retail—dominate financial information cases. As shown in
Table 3, 63.3 percent of the defendants traded in the securities
of High Technology issuers. Another 8.2 percent traded in Retail
securities. The stock prices of companies in these industries
tend to be particularly sensitive to earnings and other financial
news, further suggesting that those trading on the information
were aware of its materiality.277
Table 3
Financial Information Cases by Industry
Frequency Percent
IT & High Technology
Retail
Oil & Gas
Apparel & Textiles
Biotechnology
Other
Total

62
8
5
5
4
14
98

63.27
8.16
5.10
5.10
4.08
14.29

Cumulative
Percent
63.27
71.43
76.53
81.63
85.71
100.00

Note: Cases against individual defendants traded on the basis of MNPI
concerning financial results. Multiple defendants traded in the same stocks,
so percentages do not reflect industry frequency.

Still, in Ahern’s study, earnings announcements had the
smallest average returns—13.5 percent.278 They also had the
smallest pre-announcement run-up (9.2 percent) and the

276. Id.
277. The sensitivity of companies in these industries to unexpected
financial results is why allegations involving misrepresentations of earnings
or similar data figure so prominently in securities class actions as well. See
generally Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism through Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class
Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368 (2012).
278. Ahern, supra note 257, at 32 tbl.1.
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smallest announcement day returns (7.0 percent).279 While
these data might suggest that enforcers employ a more
capacious definition of materiality for financial information,
there is another possibility.
In my dataset, which overlaps in time with the one Ahern
employs, nearly 30 percent of the defendants trading on
financial information (28.6 percent) were SMPs. These
defendants can be expected to trade larger amounts leading to
larger potential pre-announcement price increases. Indeed, the
average total profits alleged in the sample are about 3.5 times
larger for the financial information cases as for the M&A cases.
Insider trading cases involving SMPs also have significantly
higher trading profits than cases with other defendants. 280 The
lower event day returns may thus be the product of greater
run-up rather than from the greater frequency of cases in which
enforcers base their claims on marginally material
information.281
C.

Product Approval Cases

As with M&A cases, there is usually little doubt about
materiality in the 5 percent of cases involving product
approvals. The twenty-three cases in the sample involved ten
separate companies, all of which were either biotechnology or
medical equipment manufacturers.282 These were usually small
companies, often with a single product in the FDA approval
process.283 A typical example involved trading in GTx, Inc., a
279. Id.
280. The average total profit (both the direct profit to the defendant and
the profit earned by downstream tippees) for cases with SMPs was $9.7 million
(in real 2016 dollars) compared to $3.3 million in cases without such
defendants. These differences are significant at about 1 percent.
281. See Ahern, supra note 257, at 43 (stating that insider trading has a
significant effect on stock prices, moving them closer to their fundamental
values).
282. Companies were classified by industry using their SIC codes. Of the
ten companies, six manufacture Pharmaceutical Preparations (2834), three
make Biological Products (2836), and one produced Medical Equipment (3829).
283. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Chu, No. 14-cv-00995 (C.D. Cal. May
19, 2014), ECF No. 1; Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Lama, No. 14-cv-00996 (C.D. Cal.
May 19, 2014), ECF No. 1.
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biotechnology company with a prostate cancer drug in Phase II
clinical trials.284 Two doctors were lead investigators. 285 Within
minutes of learning that the FDA suspended those trials due to
safety concerns, they sold a significant number of shares.286 The
next day, when the company publicly disclosed the hold, its
stock price dropped 36 percent.287
In terms of market reaction, GTx is a typical product case.
In Ahern’s study, cases involving clinic trial and drug regulatory
announcements had the largest average returns over the
shortest time period.288 Unlike M&A transactions, which may
develop over many months and which may therefore create
longer periods for tipping and trading, clinical trial results are
usually disclosed quickly. Thus, trading in this MNPI does little
to benefit allocative efficiency. But, given the importance of
these products for the companies involved, the stock market
effects are even greater than for M&A transactions. Gains from
positive news events averaged 101.2 percent, while losses
avoided for negative ones averaged 38.6 percent.289 The average
holding period was just 9.2 days.290
The product approval cases provide a good illustration of
another flaw in a common critique of insider trading
enforcement—that enforcers and courts use the fact of trading
alone to demonstrate materiality, effectively combining two
elements (purchase or sale and materiality) into a single
element. This critique is simply inaccurate. Enforcers and
courts do not focus on the fact of the trade in isolation, but on
the trade within the broader factual context of the case. Among
the circumstantial evidence that complaints and court decisions
highlight are the speed with which the defendant acts on the

284. See SEC Charges Two Clinical Drug Trial Doctors with Insider
Trading, Litigation Release No. 22996, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1700 (May 19, 2014)
(detailing charges against two urologists for insider trading on a
biopharmaceutical company).
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See Ahern, supra note 257, at 32.
289. See id.
290. See id.
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tipped information,291 the size of the trade,292 the type of security
traded,293 and how the trade compared to the defendant’s prior
history of trading.294 The simple fact that an individual trades
rarely stands in isolation as the only evidence of materiality.
D.

The Limits of Insider Trading Enforcement

The overwhelming focus on suspicious trading prior to
dramatic market events likely creates a problem of
under- rather than over-enforcement. To see why, consider the
old joke about the policeman who comes across a drunk looking
for his lost set of keys under a streetlamp. 295 The policeman joins
the search and after a few fruitless minutes asks the drunk if he
291. See SEC Charges Two Clinical Drug Trial Doctors with Insider
Trading, Litigation Release No. 22996, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1700 (May 19, 2014)
(involving a defendant who placed sell orders within minutes of learning that
FDA was placing clinical trials on hold); see also Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Itri,
No. 14-cv-02525 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2014), ECF No. 1 (alleging a tippee sold stock
minutes after learning about negative clinical trial results); SEC v. Michel,
521 F. Supp. 2d 795, 828 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating that tippee bought stock the
morning after discussing company negotiations on a flight); United States v.
Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing tippee’s
instructions to wait to purchase stock until tipper provided guidance).
292. See Boudreault, Exchange Act Release No. 75420, 2015 SEC LEXIS
2881 (July 10, 2015) (finding that defendant sold 100 percent of stock held in
personal brokerage account and 40 percent of stock in IRA account after
learning that FDA was placing hold on clinical trial); Complaint ¶¶ 4–5, SEC
v. Fan, No. 11-cv-00096 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 1 (alleging that
on several days, tippee’s trades accounted for the majority of volume in entire
market); see also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating that evidence of a large trade could demonstrate use of material
nonpublic information); United States v. Larrabee, 240 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.
2001) (describing tippee’s purchase following tip as “nearly twice as large” as
any prior trades).
293. See SEC Charges Former Pharmaceutical Company Executive and
Friend with Insider Trading, Litigation Release No. 23125, 2014 SEC LEXIS
4095 (June 30, 2017) (detailing scheme where tippee invested in spread bets,
which allowed him to profit from changes in the underlying value of the
company’s stock and options); Complaint ¶ 9, SEC v. Cohen, No. 10-cv-02514
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010) (alleging that tippee purchased short-term, out-of-the
money put options); Complaint ¶ 5, SEC v. Fan, No. 11-cv-00096 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 1 (same).
294. See Boudreault, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2881, at 3 (stating that sale was
largest single trade in four years).
295. See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 11, 17–18 (1964).
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is sure that was where he lost his keys. “Oh no,” the drunk
replies, “I lost them in the park, but the light is better here.”296
For enforcers, the streetlamp shines most brightly in M&A
transactions and in the other contexts discussed above.
Available evidence suggests that both the SEC and the SROs
focus their monitoring on these situations, not necessarily
because that is where most insider trading occurs but because
that is where it is easiest to find and prosecute.297 This
observational bias is not unique to enforcers. Academic studies
also tend to focus on the same limited contexts. 298
To understand these limitations, it is necessary to focus
somewhat more closely on the extent to which the SEC relies on
FINRA to identify potential insider trading cases. Most criminal
insider trading cases come from referrals from the SEC or from
the work of the FBI.299 The majority of civil cases do not appear
to originate from the SEC’s own investigative efforts.300 SROs
perform the primary surveillance function, with the SEC
supplementing those efforts with its own resources and those of
criminal enforcement authorities.301
SEC litigation releases typically credit either the sources of
a filed civil case or agencies (such as the FBI) who provided
assistance in the investigation.302 As previously shown in Table
1 more than half of the SEC’s cases (59.0 percent) come from
FINRA referrals. This figure likely undercounts the number of
cases originating with FINRA. The evidence suggests the SEC
was more consistent in referencing referrals in the later parts of
the study period, meaning the data likely undercount earlier
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 252–253 and accompanying text.
298. See Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Insider Trading in Takeover
Targets, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 598, 598 (2012) (“[T]akeovers are one of the most
researched topics in finance.”).
299. See Mary Jo White, supra note 246 (discussing how various insider
trading cases originated).
300. See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading, supra note 155, at 2
(describing the Enforcement Division’s daily collaboration with counterparts
across self-regulatory organizations).
301. See id. at 3 (describing the SRO’s surveillance systems).
302. See, e.g., SEC Charges Two Clinical Drug Trial Doctors with Insider
Trading, Litigation Release No. 22996, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1700 (May 19, 2014)
(discussing the FDA’s role in assisting the investigation).
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referrals. The Options Regulatory Surveillance Authority
(ORSA), another SRO now operating under FINRA’s
supervision, appears in 25.0 percent of litigation releases. By
contrast, the SEC’s Market Abuse Unit is cited for its
investigative efforts in only 15.3 percent of filed cases, often in
conjunction with the work of the SROs.303
It is important to consider the potential benefits and costs
of this system. SROs are valuable to the SEC because they allow
the agency to partially outsource its investigations and
presumably leverage the resources it deploys for detecting
violations.304 Beyond such institutional benefits, SROs provide
individualized benefits for risk-averse enforcement attorneys.
For these attorneys, the more uncertainty associated with case
outcomes, the greater pressure there is to pursue safer choices.
Receiving a pre-packaged case from FINRA pinpointing a highly
unusual, albeit small, trading pattern will be hard for many
enforcement attorneys to ignore. All things being equal, these
matters will tend to be viewed as low-risk options. Even if the
investigation does not lead to a successful action, it will be easier
for the enforcement attorney to blame a faulty SRO referral
when her actions are reviewed.
But those benefits come with a significant cost. In
connection with efforts that began in 2007, the SEC
enforcement staff developed the Automated Bluesheet Analysis
Project (“ABAP”).305 Bluesheets provide detailed, trade-level
data about trading in the subject security, including account
information. They are typically the starting point for insider
303. There are two reasons for the lower percentage of Market Abuse Unit
cases. First, it is in part attributable to a reorganization of the Enforcement
Division, which occurred during the study period. The Market Abuse Unit did
not exist until the reorganization was announced in January 2010. Second,
the Market Abuse Unit was formed to investigate complex, serial, and often
hard-to-detect insider trading. It does not generally pursue traditional
“one-off” cases.
304. See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading, supra note 155 (“The
surveillance departments at the SROs . . . use cutting-edge software programs
to isolate unusual trading activity that may indicate insider trading.”).
305. See Khuzami, supra note 53 (explaining that the project helps
enforcement staff “recognize suspicious trading patterns and identify
relationships and connections among multiple traders and across multiple
securities”).
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trading investigations.306 In developing the ABAP, the SEC’s
enforcement staff informally assessed the range of bluesheet
coverage indicated by the number, scope, and timing of
bluesheet requests made for trading in front of M&A
announcements.307 By comparing those requests to the number
of high value M&A transactions in a particular year, the staff
observed that while regulators were historically effective in
identifying and investigating suspicious trading based on the
technological resources available to them, they could improve
their bluesheet coverage and thereby expand their investigative
reach by being more strategic in their focus on which
transactions to bluesheet, among other things.308 In developing
ABAP, the enforcement staff focused on traders whose trading
patterns in the same stocks at the same time suggested that
they potentially knew each other, had a common source of
information, had shared MNPI, and had engaged in coordinated
insider trading.309 Indeed, the enforcement staff’s assessment in
developing the ABAP was that while existing surveillance
techniques were adequate to identify opportunistic insider
trading on a “one-off” basis, they often did not capture
coordinated or serial trading among more sophisticated market
participants.310
These results led the SEC enforcement staff to rethink its
investigative approach and to deploy ABAP to identify potential
relationships among traders and potential common sources of
material nonpublic information. Developing what it calls a
“trader-based” rather than “security-based” approach, the SEC
looks for traders who collectively exhibit unusual trading
patterns across different securities, and then tries to find
common sources of information or relationship that link them
306. When the SEC begins an investigation on its own initiative of as a
result of a referral, it the sends out so-called bluesheet requests to
broker-dealers and clearinghouses. FINRA also uses bluesheets in its
preliminary investigations. See Electronic Blue Sheets (EBS), FINRA,
https://perma.cc/NKZ6-8XW6 (PDF) (describing Electronic Blue Sheets and
their role in regulatory enforcement).
307. Hawke Interview, supra note 53.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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together.311 But even under this approach, the SEC must still
prove materiality and it therefore is still likely to focus on cases
involving significant stock price movements. Materiality
concerns continue to play a dominant role even in cases
investigated under the trader-based approach. For example, in
a case against a former law firm managing clerk, many of the
transactions alleged in the complaint had announcement
returns of over 30 percent.312 The trader-based approach simply
allowed the SEC to identify insider trading in additional deals
with no or only small abnormal returns.313 And, of course, the
case still focused on trading preceding M&A transactions.314
To be sure, the intense focus on M&A transactions appears
to have created some beneficial deterrent effects. 315 Studying
stock price run-ups before deal announcements, Del Guercio and
her co-authors find a smaller price impact in the early 2000s
than was found in studies of insider trading in the 1980s, a

311. The more frequently two traders appear to trade in front of the same
stocks, the more likely it is that they know each other. See Todd Ehret, SEC’s
Advanced Data Analytics Helps Detect Even the Smallest Illicit Market
Activity, REUTERS (June 30, 2017, 1:11 PM) https://perma.cc/PB99-QXQD
(PDF) (“In contrast to the ‘security-based’ approach, the ‘trader-based’
approach examines or mines ‘blue sheet’ data to detect and analyze individual
and institutional traders to determine which securities they trade.”).
312. See Complaint ¶ 55, SEC v. Eydelman, No. 14-cv-01742 (D.N.J. Mar.
19, 2014), ECF No. 1 (describing the ill-gotten gains as resulting in $5.6
million in profits).
313. See Stockbroker in Post-It Note Insider Trading Case Sentenced to 36
Months in Prison, Litigation Release No. 23667, 2016 SEC LEXIS 3721 (Sept.
30, 2016) (detailing elaborate and covert information-passing scheme from
tipper to tippee).
314. See id. (noting that the schemes involved “more than a dozen pending
corporate transactions”).
315. Moves toward greater private ordering likely have also played a role.
Black-out periods, pre-clearance for high level executives, or other policies are
common at publicly traded companies. See J.C. Bettis et al., Corporate Policies
Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 192 (2000). These
private ordering mechanisms appear to deter at least some kinds of improper
trading. See Inmoo Lee et al., Do Voluntary Corporate Restrictions on Insider
Trading Eliminate Informed Insider Trading?, 29 J. CORP. FIN. 158, 177
(2014).

1704

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1647 (2020)

result they attribute to greater fear of legal liability.316 Lisa
Meulbroek’s study of that earlier period found an average
abnormal return of 3.1 percent on days with insider trading.317
By contrast, Del Guercio found average abnormal run-ups in
their sample of cases filed between 2003 and 2011 of only 0.5
percent, an 80 percent decrease.318 To address self-selection
problems, the authors also looked at the impact of SEC
enforcement intensity on the size of pre-announcement
run-ups.319 In the 1980s, 40 percent of the abnormal return
occurred in the twenty days before the announcement compared
to just 10 percent in the latter years of the Del Guercio study.320
There is little doubt that enforcement deters insider
trading. The problem is that greater scrutiny only leads to
greater deterrence if market participants perceive that
enforcement activities increase the likelihood of detection.321
This is why law enforcement strategies that crack down on
particular crimes have been shown to be effective,322 although
often those reductions are temporary.323 But an enforcement
program dominated by small traders engaged in obvious
violations may very well create the opposite perception.
Sophisticated insider traders, like street criminals who displace
their activities from more heavily patrolled to less heavily

316. Diane Del Guercio et al., The Deterrent Effect of SEC Enforcement
Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading: Evidence from Run-up Before News
Events, 60 J. L. & ECON. 269, 271 (2017).
317. Meulbroek, supra note 234, at 1676 tbl.v.
318. Del Guercio et al., supra note 316, at 271.
319. Id. at 272.
320. Id.
321. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 784–86 (2010);
Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1346
(2006) (describing the components of deterrence to include perception by
market participants).
322. See, e.g., Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A
Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 18–19 (2017) (detailing a policing
strategy aimed specifically at youth violence in Boston and its expansion to
other cities around the United States).
323. See Paternoster, supra note 321, at 793–94 (collecting studies).
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patrolled neighborhoods, may simply shift their illicit trading
strategies in ways designed to avoid detection.324
As Kate Andrias has noted, sophisticated parties tend to be
“aware of informal, undisclosed policies of nonenforcement or
prioritization.”325 And it seems equally likely that they have a
reasonably subtle appreciation for how targeted crimes are
detected. Because detection techniques rely so heavily on the
temporal proximity between the trade and a dramatic market
event there are several ways that sophisticated traders could
adopt strategies to obscure their violations. Indeed, there is
empirical evidence suggesting that traders continue to earn
abnormal market returns through trading strategies evidently
designed to avoid, if not detection, at least enforcement.326 For
example, some company insiders are apparently able to avoid
losses associated with previously uninterrupted strings of
earnings increases by selling their shares before those breaks.327
Rather than concentrating their sales immediately before the
breaks, insiders shift their trading to earlier time periods, 328
which not only makes detection more difficult but creates
additional legal hurdles for enforcers, who must show that the
trading was on the basis of MNPI. This strategy appears to
exploit the rules of thumb enforcers use. It is often the case that
the closer in time trades are made before a public
announcement, the more likely an SEC investigation will
result.329
In M&A transactions, the SEC tends to focus on trading in
the common stock of the target company. Common stock trading
324. See John J. Donohue et al., Do Police Reduce Crime? A Reexamination
of a Natural Experiment, in EMPIRICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS: ASSESSING THE
PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 125, 125 (Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2013)
(finding that criminals move their activities when policing increases in their
local areas).
325. Andrias, supra note 38, at 1098.
326. See Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know about Future Earnings and
How They Use It: Evidence from Insider Trades, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 316
(2003) (noting traders’ awareness of trading patterns and strategies to lower
detection).
327. See id. at 330 (explaining that insiders must sell before the break to
“avoid the stock price drop which coincides with the break”).
328. See id. at 343.
329. Hawke Interview, supra note 53.
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accounts for 55.3 percent of M&A cases in the dataset. Pure
derivative trading is just 11.8 percent. Given the incentive
structure of enforcement attorneys, this emphasis makes sense.
As shown in more detail below, cases involving common share
trading prior to M&A announcements, particularly those
referred by FINRA, settle more quickly than other kinds of
cases.330 These cases represent easy opportunities for
enforcement attorneys and the agency to increase their win
rates.
But only the least sophisticated traders are likely to engage
in such trading. Savvier, more experienced traders may devise
profitable trading strategies that are subtler. For example, a
recent study shows traders shifting to two types of derivative
transactions: (1) out-of-the-money call options of target
companies; and (2) at-the-money straddles of the acquiring
companies, which have positive returns if the acquirer’s stock
price moves in either direction. Trading volumes tend to be
higher in larger deals with greater liquidity, conditions that
make it easier to disguise informed trading.331 These patterns
are consistent with sophisticated traders exploiting MNPI in
ways that enforcers are less likely to detect or pursue.332
As a result, for all the resources devoted to detection, to the
extent that enforcers continue to focus predominantly on
common stock trading before dramatic market events, they
remain much more likely to uncover the least sophisticated
traders engaged in the most obvious insider trading.333 Indeed,
as computer power and analytical sophistication grow,
investigators both at the SEC and FINRA are now able to
330. See infra Part VII.A.
331. See Augustin, supra note 257, at 9; Alex Frino et al., How Much Does
an Illegal Insider Trade?, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. 241, 252 (2013) (insiders decrease
trade volumes in response to increases in the likelihood of detection).
332. See Jon A. Garfinkel, New Evidence on the Effects of Federal
Regulations on Insider Trading: The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act (ITSFEA), 3 J. CORP. FIN. 89, 96–104 (1997) (noting that there
is evidence that informed traders shift their trading patterns in response to
changes in penalty severity, consistent with standard deterrence theory).
333. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider
Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 333 (1998)
(explaining that the SEC will focus its enforcement resources where violations
are most likely to have occurred and will be the easiest to prove).
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identify small, suspicious trading anomalies that might
previously have gone undetected.334 The referrals the SEC
receives from SROs (Table 4) generally involve these smaller
matters. For example, the mean (median) alleged profits in
cases referred by FINRA are $2.39 million ($176,686),
significantly less than the mean and median profits in cases
from other sources ($7.94 million and $791,760).
Table 4
Total Alleged Profits in Referred Insider Trading
Cases
Mean

Median

$2,385,832**
$7.937,938

$176,686
$791,760

$1,709,060*
$6,175,192

$440,657
$279,031

FINRA
FINRA Referral
No FINRA Referral
ORSA
ORSA Referral
No ORSA Referral

Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001
Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents. Total profits are
in inflation adjusted 2016 dollars and represent the defendant’s alleged
profits and the profits of all other members in the same insider trading
network.

To be sure, such trading remains unlawful, and it is hard to
argue that enforcers should not pursue such cases, particularly
where investigation is easy, cheap, and quick.
But it is not. SROs do not have subpoena powers.335 The
SEC still has to investigate SRO referrals before filing a case. I
analyzed the time between the first alleged insider trading
event and the filing of an SEC action. The mean (median)
334. See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIES FRAUD § 6:110 (2d ed. 2020) (stating that technological
developments have enabled “the SEC to sift through all the ‘chatter’ of
available financial and personal information in order to detect insider
trading”).
335. See 6 BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 334, § 12:192 (“[S]elf-regulatory
organizations lack subpoena power . . . .”).
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number of days is 1180 (1215). In other words, it takes enforcers
on average over three years to identify, investigate, and file the
cases they bring. We cannot directly observe the intensity of
investigative effort over this time period. 336 But SEC officials
have repeatedly emphasized how time-consuming and
labor-intensive insider trading investigations are.337 Whatever
the potential mix of cases it might choose to investigate, the
agency is devoting considerable effort to a large number of
small, simple cases. Given all of the ways that the SEC could
deploy its enforcement resources, it is a legitimate question
whether pursuing these cases as extensively as it does is likely
to be a rational and effective deterrence strategy. 338 That
question is all the more salient given that the SEC’s
enforcement choices are almost entirely insulated from judicial
review.339
Indeed, the incentives to pursue small, easily resolved cases
may be increasing. In a series of recent cases, the Supreme
Court has applied a five-year statute of limitations on SEC
enforcement actions seeking either civil penalties or
disgorgement, the primary recoveries in insider trading cases.340
While these decisions would preclude only a minority of SEC
cases and limit the SEC’s ability to obtain disgorgement in
others, they may create additional incentives for the agency to
eschew long, complicated investigations of complex schemes in
336. See 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (2020) (“[A]ll formal investigative proceedings
shall be non-public.”).
337. See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading, supra note 155
(describing how time intensive, “complex[,] and painstaking” insider trading
cases can be).
338. See David Freeman Enstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123
YALE L.J. 616, 684 (2013) (noting that scholars have “long contended that the
SEC tends to pursue relatively small cases in an effort to pad its success
rate . . . rather than allocating scarce enforcement resources with an eye to
optimizing deterrence”).
339. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (stating that agencies
are endowed with considerable discretion “attributable in no small part to the
general unsuitability for judicial review of decisions to refuse enforcement”).
340. See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 442 (2013) (explaining that if the
SEC seeks civil penalties, it must file suit within five years of the date when
the claim accrued, pursuant to a general statute of limitations); Kokesh v.
SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1638 (2017) (stating that a five-year statute of
limitations applies when the SEC seeks civil penalties).
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favor of obvious cases that can be investigated and filed more
quickly.341
Focusing enforcement efforts on small, unsophisticated
insider trading may do little to deter the more sophisticated
traders who are at the heart of so much enforcement rhetoric.
Indeed, the substantial disconnect between what enforcement
officials say and what they actually do in practice raises
important questions about the perceived legitimacy of insider
trading enforcement. When enforcers’ public talk deviates from
actual practices, they run the risk of muting or distorting the
message prosecutions are supposed to send. We can call this
problem “enforcement dissonance”—what enforcers claim they
are doing does not match what they are actually doing. At some
point, straying too far from the rhetorical underpinnings of
enforcement might call into question the very necessity for any
enforcement of insider trading proscriptions, precisely the
reaction we see in both academic and popular critiques.
VI.

The Misappropriation Theory and Duties of Trust and
Confidence

Few insider trading critics dispute that trading in breach of
a traditional fiduciary duty (such as those applicable to
employees or other agents) should give rise to liability,
regardless of whether that action is premised on the classical or
misappropriation theory. Similarly, the circumstances under
which temporary constructive insiders (lawyers, investment
bankers, accountants, and other consultants) inherit the
abstain or disclose duty are well settled.342 More controversy
surrounds other duties of “trust and confidence” that might give

341. See Urska Velikonja, Public Enforcement After Kokesh: Evidence
from SEC Actions, 108 GEO. L.J. 389, 431 (2019) (“The SEC’s limited resources
mean that it cannot be everywhere at all times, so Kokesh might push the
Agency to look for misconduct under the street light.”).
342. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 76 (stating that the basis for
recognizing temporary insider status is “that they have entered into a special
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and
are given access to information solely for corporate purposes” (quoting Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983))).

1710

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1647 (2020)

rise to liability under the misappropriation theory.343 Naturally
the question arises—how expansive are these duties and can
market participants predict with certainty the relationships
that create liability?
Critics charge that enforcers take too broad a view of such
duties and that they expand them to fit the needs of the actions
they want to file.344 The result is a vague and uncertain liability
standard.345 These non-traditional duties of trust and
confidence have involved
everything
from
familial
346
347
relationships,
friendships,
and
confidentiality
agreements348 to membership in organizations like Alcoholics
Anonymous, with either explicit or implicit expectations of
confidentiality.349
343. See id. (“The courts and the SEC have not . . . been so clear and
consistent in identifying who assumes a fiduciary or similar relation of trust
and confidence under the misappropriation theory.”).
344.
ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 62.
345. See Painter, supra note 120, at 157 (“[I]t is clear that the
misappropriation theory remains exceptionally vague as a standard for
criminal liability.”).
346. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1271–73 (11th Cir. 2003) (spouses);
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (parent and
child), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
347. See United States v. McPhail, 831 F.3d 1, 5–7 (1st Cir. 2016) (friends).
Most friend cases involve situations in which one friend impermissibly tips
another. These cases are analyzed under the Dirks standard and, like other
tipping cases, the key question is whether the tipper received a personal
benefit. See infra Part VII.D. By contrast, misappropriation cases often involve
one friend secretly converting MNPI for his or her personal benefit. In such
cases, the relevant question is whether the friendship creates a duty of trust
or confidence sufficient for liability under the misappropriation theory. See
McPhail, 831 F.3d at 5–7 (outlining the relationship between McPhail and
Santamaria, from whom he obtained the classified information, and
determining that there was an established level of trust and confidence
between the two that was subsequently breached by McPhail).
348. See SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489, 491 (N.D. Tex. 2005)
(concluding that MPNI learned by a tax and financial planning consultant was
confidential even though the parties had not yet entered into a contract for
those services).
349. See United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the expectation of confidentially engendered between two
parties connected through Alcoholics Anonymous that resulted in one trading
on MPNI learned in the confines of that relationship violated Rule 10b-5); SEC
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Front and center in this critique is the SEC’s adoption of
Rule 10b5-2.350 Promulgated in the wake of United States v.
Chestman351 and other cases that tried to cabin the reach of the
misappropriation theory,352 the rule defines three non-exclusive
situations that give rise to the requisite duty of trust and
confidence: (1) whenever a person agrees to maintain
information in confidence; (2) whenever there is a “history,
pattern, or practice” of sharing confidential information that
gives rise to an expectation of confidentiality; and (3) between
close family members, specifically a “spouse, parent, child, or
sibling.”353 Commentators have questioned the validity of at
least some aspects of Rule 10b5-2, primarily asserting that the
SEC does not have the authority to extend liability beyond
traditional fiduciary duties or duties of trust and confidence that
are “similar” to traditional fiduciary duties.354 Under this view,
only relationships that involve both discretionary authority and
dependency are sufficiently similar to warrant potential

v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (confirming the existence
of an express duty of confidentiality among members of CEO Roundtable). But
see United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012–13 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that trading on MPNI learned through membership in Young
Presidents Organization did not give rise to misappropriation liability).
350. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2020).
351. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
352. See id. at 567 (stating that the court will “tread cautiously in
extending the misappropriation theory to new relationships, lest our efforts to
construe Rule 10b-5 lose method and predictability”); Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,602 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (citing
Chestman).
353. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b) (2020).
354. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 231, at 104 (stating that there is “some
doubt as to the validity of the Rule” and that that courts should be “loath” to
employ this phraseology as an expansion method).
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liability.355 For the most part, courts have found Rule 10b5-2 to
be a proper exercise of delegated authority.356
Whatever the merits of those arguments, what have
securities enforcers actually done in practice? Are there large
numbers of cases premised on overly broad interpretations of
duties of trust and confidence? Are there significant differences
between civil and criminal cases?
The data presented here only partially support existing
critiques. As Table 5 shows, there were 121 defendants in the
sample who were alleged to have misappropriated MNPI in
breach of a fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence owed
to the source of the information. For the most part these cases
were unexceptionable. Nearly half of the defendants were
alleged to have traded on or disclosed MNPI they learned
through an employment relationship (47.9 percent). There is no
dispute that misappropriation liability is appropriate in these
situations because employees are agents who owe a fiduciary
duty to the principal and have an obligation not to use the
principal’s information for their benefit.357 Another 18.2 percent
of cases are premised on a traditional fiduciary relationship

355. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569 (“We have little trouble finding the
evidence insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship or its functional
equivalent between Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family.”). But see
Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (finding the basis for liability on the alleged
“disparate knowledge and expertise” of Kornman, placing no emphasis on
discretionary authority or dependence).
356. See McGee, 763 F.3d at 310–16 (finding Rule 10b5-2 proper in both
the SEC’s rulemaking authority and in supporting convictions for securities
fraud and perjury).
357. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 231, at 105; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“[I]t is a breach of an agent’s duty to use
confidential information of the principal for the purpose of effecting trades in
securities . . . .”).
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involving professionals such as lawyers,358 accountants,359 or
investment bankers.360 Roughly two-thirds of misappropriation
actions, therefore, are premised on uncontroversial fiduciary
relationships.
Table 5
Alleged Duties in Misappropriation Cases
Nature of Duty
Civil Only
Criminal
Total
Employment
32 (42.67)
26 (56.52)
58 (47.93)
Other Traditional
12 (16.00)
10 (21.74)
22 (18.18)
Fiduciary
Family Relationship
13 (17.33)
2 (04.35)
15 (12.40)
Friendship
7 (09.33)
3 (06.52)
10 (08.26)
Confidentiality Agreement 8 (10.67)
4 (08.70)
12 (09.92)
Other
2 (02.67)
1 (02.17)
3 (02.48)
Unknown
1 (01.33)
0 (00.00)
1 (00.83)
Total
75
46
121
Note: Number (percent) of fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence
defendant violated in misappropriation cases as alleged in the complaint or
other charging document.

Cases based on family relationships, friendships, or
breaches of confidentiality agreements are less frequent. Of
these, family relationships are the most prevalent (involving
17.3 percent of civil defendants) and the least problematic. To
be sure, some early cases argued that not all close family
relationships necessarily gave rise to a duty of trust and
358. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 4, SEC v. Grewal, No. 14-cv-02026 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 22, 2014), ECF No. 1 (stating that defendant was primary outside counsel
that advised on matters of “corporate and securities law.”); Complaint ¶ 1,
SEC v. Cutillo, No. 09-cv-09208 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009), ECF No. 1 (alleging
that defendant, an attorney, “misappropriated from his law firm material,
nonpublic information concerning at least four corporate acquisitions or bids”).
359. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 6, SEC v. London, No. 13-cv-02558 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 11, 2013), ECF No. 1 (involving a partner at a large accounting firm);
Halpern, Exchange Act Release No. 71748, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1008 (Mar. 19,
2014) (issuing a cease-and-desist order describing defendant as “a personal tax
accountant”).
360. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1–2, SEC v. Hixon, No. 14-cv-00158 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 20, 2014), ECF No. 2 (stating that the defendant had spent “at least the
last 12 years of his career as an investment banker”).
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confidence,361 but Rule 10b5-2 replaced the case-by-case
analysis those decisions called for with a bright-line rule. While
critics might disagree with how the SEC has drawn that line, if
the primary complaint about the misappropriation theory is
that it creates uncertain liability because duties of trust and
confidence are poorly specified, then defining the precise
relationships that give rise to liability should adequately
address these concerns.362 The family cases enforcers bring tend
to fit squarely within the confines of Rule 10b5-2.363
Misappropriation cases premised on friendship can be more
problematic. The SEC often couples allegations of friendship
with allegations of a confidentiality agreement or with some
evidence of a history, pattern, and practice of sharing
confidences to try to fit the cases within the confines of Rule
10b5-2. In some cases, these allegations are quite detailed,364
but all too frequently the evidence is rather thin and the

361. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“[M]ore than the gratuitous reposal of a secret to another who happens to be
a family member is required to establish a fiduciary or similar relationship of
trust and confidence.”).
362. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden
Fruit: A New Story of Eve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1017, 1039 (2009)
(“[C]ontinuing uncertainty regarding the identity of the beneficiary of the
requisite duty of trust and confidence for insider trading liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 further illustrates the unclear nature of that duty
under existing doctrine.”).
363. See Complaint ¶ 11a, United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-cr-10131 (D.
Mass. Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 3 (husband misappropriated MNPI from wife);
Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Goetz, No. 11-cv-01220 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 2011), ECF
No. 1 (father misappropriated MNPI from daughter); Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v.
Ni, No. 11-cv-0708 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1 (brother
misappropriated MNPI from sister). But see Order Denying Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law at 2, SEC v. Jacobs, No. 13-cv-01289
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2014), ECF No. 112 (no liability following a conversation
between brothers).
364. See Complaint ¶¶ 13–19, SEC v. Schvacho, No. 12-mi-99999 (N.D.
Ga. July 24, 2012), ECF No. 1509 (providing a detailed account of the
relationship between the insider and the accused); Complaint ¶¶ 56–63, SEC
v. Scammell, No. 11-cv-06597(C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1 (involving
a similar detailed account of allegations against defendant).
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allegations conclusory.365 For example, in SEC v. Darden,366 the
defendant allegedly misappropriated MNPI from a director
regarding a company’s proposed merger.367 The SEC alleged
that the two men “maintained regular contact over 30 years”
and shared an office suite for six years.368 But the only allegation
about an agreement was the conclusory statement that “they
shared information, which information was expected to be and
was maintained as confidential.”369 In some cases, there is
virtually no factual detail regarding the relationship. In SEC v.
Doyle,370 the only allegations were that the insider was the
defendant’s house guest and inadvertently left deal documents
there.371 That is hardly the stuff of a duty of trust and
confidence, but those issues were never litigated.372 The case
settled the day after it was filed, as did many of the friendship
cases.
Cases based solely on confidentiality agreements have been
similarly controversial. Early decisions often held that “a
fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a
person with confidential information.”373 As noted, some
commentators use these holdings to question the validity of Rule
10b5-2(b)(1), which defines breach of such an agreement to be

365. See SEC v. Conradt, 947 F. Supp. 2d 406, 411–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(recognizing shortcomings of SEC’s allegations but finding them sufficient for
purposes of a motion to dismiss).
366. No. 13-cv-00138 (N.D. Ga.).
367. Complaint ¶ 12, SEC v. Darden, No. 13-cv-00138 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15,
2013), ECF No. 1.
368. Id. ¶ 13.
369. Id. ¶ 14; see Complaint ¶ 13, SEC v. Drewery, No. 14-cv-00299
(E.D.N.C. May 27, 2014), ECF No. 1 (alleging that the men were “best friends”
and had known each other for thirty-five years); Complaint ¶ 18, SEC v.
McEnery, No. 15-cv-04091 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015), ECF No. 1 (involving a
defendant and an insider that had “dated on and off since the early 1990s” and
had a “history of sharing confidences”).
370. No. 11-cv-04964 (S.D.N.Y.).
371. Complaint ¶¶ 10–11, SEC v. Doyle, No. 11-cv-04964 (S.D.N.Y. July
19, 2011), ECF No. 1.
372. Agreed Final Judgment at 1, SEC v. Doyle, No. 11-cv-04964 (S.D.N.Y.
July 21, 2011), ECF No. 4.
373. Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980)
(applying Delaware law).
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sufficient for misappropriation liability.374 But many of the
cases enforcers actually bring involve clear-cut situations in
which the defendants violated explicit confidentiality
agreements. Often these cases involve doctors supervising
clinical trials375 or other kinds of consulting arrangements. 376 In
other cases, defendants were provided confidential offering
information only after they agreed not to trade on it or tip it to
anyone else.377 None of these cases involve overly aggressive
interpretations of duties of trust and confidence.
Taken together, there is some evidence the SEC
expansively interprets duties of trust and confidence,
particularly with respect to misappropriation among friends.
While such cases constitute a small part of the civil enforcement
actions, it would be particularly troubling if those same
expansive and vague interpretations arose in the criminal
context. Vague standards in criminal prosecutions could raise

374. See Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”: Rule
10b5-2(b)(1), Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of Insider
Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1487 (2010) (stating that Chestman
remains the “most influential” case on the matter of duties required and that
this reliance has engendered different responses to the validity of the Rule in
courts).
375. See Boudreault, Securities Act Release No. 9864, Exchange Act
Release No. 75420, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2881 (July 10, 2015) (describing
defendant as a consultant for medical clinical trials); Amended Complaint ¶ 2,
SEC v. CR Intrinsic Invs., LLC, No. 12-cv-08466 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013),
ECF No. 25 (stating that Defendant Gilman “served as the chairman of the
Safety Monitoring Committee (the “SMC”) overseeing the clinical trial”);
Amended Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Benhamou, No. 10-cv-08266 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
13, 2011), ECF No. 3 (stating that Dr. Benhamou “was one of five members of
a Steering Committee overseeing the clinical trial”).
376. See Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Condon, No. 15-cv-07443 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 2015), ECF No. 1 (consultant retained to provide executive coaching
services).
377. See Complaint ¶ 1, United States v. Fishoff, No. 15-mj-03622 (D.N.J.
May 29, 2015), ECF No. 1 (stating that defendants “received inside
information concerning a confidentially marketed secondary stock
offering . . . pursuant to defendants’ entry into confidentiality or
“wall-crossing” agreements” prohibiting disclosure or trading in the company’s
securities).
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significant due process concerns,378 and expansive applications
of sparse statutory language would be inconsistent with the rule
of lenity that normal applies to the interpretation of criminal
statutes.379
There is a little evidence, however, that expansive civil
interpretations of duties of trust and confidence present a
particular problem in criminal cases. Courts have often shown
some sensitivity to expanding duties of trust and confidence in
criminal cases even if they are willing to do so in civil ones.380
The data suggest that criminal prosecutors consider these
concerns. As Table 5 shows, criminal and civil enforcers bring
similar proportions of misappropriation cases. Approximately a
quarter of the defendants subject to criminal prosecution (24.9
percent) were alleged to have misappropriated MNPI, compared
to 27.1 percent in exclusively civil actions. Nontraditional duties
of trust and confidence, however, appear with far greater
frequency in civil cases. About 41 percent of civil cases involve a
nontraditional duty of trust and confidence compared to just
21.7 percent for criminal cases. These differences are significant
at less than 5 percent.
When criminal enforcement authorities pursue cases
involving nontraditional fiduciary duties, they typically involve
relatively egregious cases of insider trading, often involving
close family members. These are the kinds of cases that tend not
to test the boundaries of insider trading doctrine. For example,
Matthew Devlin stole MNPI from his wife, an executive at a
communications firm that provided services to companies
engaged in M&A transactions.381 Devlin tipped the information
to day traders, who referred to Devlin’s wife as the “Golden
Goose” in text messages because of the valuable information she

378. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980) (“[A]
judicial holding that certain undefined activities ‘generally are prohibited’ by
§ 10(b) would raise questions whether either criminal or civil defendants
would be given fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity.”).
379. Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1005 (2014) (Scalia, J.).
380. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272 n.22 (11th Cir. 2003) (declining
to narrowly circumscribe duties of trust and confidence in civil context).
381. United States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 607, 609–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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possessed.382 But the court did not rest its finding of a duty of
trust and confidence solely on the marriage relationship.383
Instead, it held that the indictment could not be dismissed
because it alleged “repeated disclosure of business secrets” and
an agreement to maintain the confidentiality of those secrets
sufficient to demonstrate “the functional equivalent of a
fiduciary relationship.”384 Such allegations would be sufficient
even under the most restrictive interpretations of the
misappropriation theory.
Criminal cases based on friendship tend not to be based
solely on the existence of the relationship itself. Rather, they
typically involve strong evidence of an agreement to maintain
information in confidence, thus fitting easily within the confines
of Rule 10b5-2. For example, in United States v. McPhail,385 the
defendant was close friends with an executive of a publicly
traded company.386 The executive disclosed MNPI in confidence
to McPhail, warning him that he should never repeat anything
they discussed.387 Nonetheless, McPhail tipped the MNPI to
other friends.388 Evidence in the case showed both that McPhail
knew that he should maintain the confidentiality of the MNPI
and that passing it on was wrongful.389
Taken together, these data suggest that civil enforcers
define duties of trust and confidence more expansively than
criminal enforcers. Criminal enforcement does sometimes
involve nontraditional fiduciary duties, but usually in cases
involving close family relationships or situations in which there
is a clear agreement to maintain the confidentiality of

382. See id. at 610 (stating that Devlin’s wife was referred to as the
“Golden Goose” because she was “able to produce precious information about
publicly-traded companies prior to its public announcement”).
383. Id.
384. Id. at 616–17 (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569
(2d Cir. 1991)).
385. 831 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016).
386. Id. at 3.
387. Id. at 5.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 6–7.
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information.390 As a result, fears that expansive civil
interpretations of duties of trust and confidence are
inappropriately broadening the scope of criminal liability
appear not be borne out by actual prosecutorial practices.
VII.

The Targets of Insider Trading Enforcement

To more fully understand how enforcement rhetoric
matches up with enforcement reality, this section provides
detailed data on which cases enforcers bring against which
defendants and how those cases are resolved. By looking at how
enforcers operationalize insider trading law, we can better
evaluate which of the competing depictions of enforcement is the
most accurate. The available evidence strongly suggests that
the SEC targets enforcement efforts at cases that are likely to
be quickly and easily resolved. Criminal enforcement, by
contrast, is generally reserved for more serious cases, measured
by, among other things, the type of defendant, the size of the
insider trading network, and the profits earned. But like civil
cases, the criminal cases tend to be those in which liability is
fairly certain.
A.

Civil Outcomes

Perhaps the best evidence that the SEC focuses its
enforcement efforts on cases that are likely to be quickly and
easily resolved are the actual enforcement outcomes. As shown
in Table 6, the sample contains 405 actions the SEC filed in
federal court that were resolved when the sample was analyzed.
The SEC won 93.1 percent of those cases. Win rates like these
are not uncommon in governmental enforcement proceedings,
and they are driven in large part by high settlement rates. More
than 90 percent of the resolved cases in the dataset were settled.
Twenty-three cases were resolved in defendants’ favor through
some form of pre-trial resolution. The SEC won only nine (64.3
percent) of the fourteen cases that went to trial.

390. See id. at 5 (“[T]he evidence that he [McPhail] knew that Santamaria
was expecting him to keep the inside information secret is quite strong.”).
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Table 6
Outcomes in Resolved SEC Federal Court Actions
Government
Settlement

Number
377
368

(% Total)
(93.09)
(90.86)

Civil Trial
Defendant
Dismissal

9
28
23

(2.22)
(6.91)
(5.68)

Civil Trial
5
(1.23)
Total
405
Note: Included all SEC civil actions in federal court that
were resolved when the sample was analyzed.

More telling than the number of cases that settle, however,
is the speed with which cases are resolved. The SEC’s actions
are typically stayed if there is a parallel criminal action,
substantially lengthening the time to resolve the case.391 As
shown in Table 1, on average, the 158 civil cases with parallel
criminal actions took 625 days to resolve, significantly longer
than the 251 days to resolve the remaining 247 civil
enforcement actions.392 But most civil actions are resolved much
more quickly. As shown in Table 7, a total of 121 cases (49.0
percent) settled within thirty days or fewer of filing. Although
the SEC takes a long time to bring cases, once it does, they wrap
up quickly.393 The shorter the case the better the outcome for
the SEC. The agency obtained a settlement in 100 percent of the
cases resolved in 180 days or fewer; it prevailed in just 81.6
percent of the cases that took longer to resolve.

391.
392.
393.

See Velikonja, supra note 341, at 423.
See infra Table 1. This difference is significant at less than 0.001.
See supra Part VII.G.
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Table 7
Days from Filing to Resolution in SEC Civil
Enforcement Actions
Number
30 Days or Fewer

(% Total)

121

(48.99)

31-364 Days

65

(26.32)

1-2 Years

36

(14.57)

More than 2 Years

25

(10.12)

247

Total

Note: Cases include only civil actions brought in federal court without
parallel criminal actions.

In terms of time to resolution, the SEC obtains significant
advantages from relying on FINRA referrals. The cases in the
dataset with FINRA referrals were resolved in an average of
just 150 days. That was significantly less time than in the cases
without FINRA referrals, which took more than twice as long
(394 days) on average.394 These data are consistent with the idea
that the FINRA referrals the SEC files are more certain, easier
cases.
B.

Targeted Defendants

The common trope in insider trading rhetoric is the director
or high-level executive of a large, often well-known company,
either trading on or tipping information. Such cases, however,
are relatively uncommon (Table 8). Overall, just 10.3 percent of
insider trading defendants were senior officers or directors. For
cases enforced only through civil actions, officer and directors
accounted for 12.8 percent of defendants. In most instances,
these individuals were from smaller firms, where looser controls
and less institutional ownership may make insider trading
easier.395 For example, Anthony Andrade was an outside
394. See supra Table 7. This difference is significant at less than 0.001.
395. Larger firms typically have more institutional ownership and
stronger governance controls. Insider trading appears to be more difficult and
enforcement less prevalent in these settings. See Lauren Cohen et al.,
Decoding Inside Information, 67 J. FIN. 1009, 1020 (2012) (stating that the
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director of a community bank who tipped three friends about the
bank’s impending acquisition.396 Frank Blystone was the
chairman of the board and CEO of an oil and gas company who
sold shares while in possession of MNPI about the firm’s
financial position.397
Table 8
Types of Defendants
Overall

Criminal

Non-Criminal

Officer and Director

48

(10.32)

12

( 6.52)

36

(12.81)

Other Employee

71

(15.27)

30

(16.30)

41

(14.59)

SMP

100

(21.51)

68

(36.96)

32

(11.39)

Lawyer

13

(2.80)

8

(4.35)

5

(1.78)

Other Professional

30

(6.45)

10

(5.43)

20

(7.12)

Friends and Family

177

(38.06)

52

(28.11)

125

(44.64)

Other

26

(5.59)

5

(2.72)

21

(7.47)

Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents. Percentages may
not add to 100 due to rounding. In some cases, data was unavailable for all
defendants. As a result, the number of observations for some variables differs.

The more common defendants are mid-level company
employees. Insider trading is thus less a violation of “the most
advantaged, privileged, and wealthy insiders in modern
finance,”398 and more one targeting middle managers. Overall,
about 15 percent of insider trading defendants are nonexecutive
officers employed by the corporate source.399 It is also not

number of insider buys is higher for smaller firms); Lee et al., supra note 315,
at 167 (noting that probabilities of information-based trading are lower for
large firms than for smaller firms).
396. SEC Charges Director of Rhode Island Bank and Three Others With
Insider Trading, Litigation Release No. 23278, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2271 (June
8, 2015).
397. SEC Charges Former Oil Company Executive With Insider Trading,
Litigation Release No. 22367, 2012 SEC LEXIS 1488 (May 11, 2012).
398. Bharara, supra note 14.
399. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Fan, No. 11-cv-00096 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 1 (manager of clinical programming).
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uncommon for lower level employees to face insider trading
charges.400
The biggest differences between the subsamples of civil and
criminal targets lie in two categories of defendants, SMPs and
an amorphous group of “friends and family” who are often the
recipients of improper tips. Case law, the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, enforcement rhetoric, and the narrative conventions
of insider trading typically portray insider trading by SMPs as
more blameworthy than other kinds of improper trading. In that
light and given that so much of the recent criminal crackdown
targeted insider trading at hedge funds, it cannot be very
surprising that SMPs appear three times more frequently in the
sampled cases with criminal components. But those differences
were not just byproducts of the crackdown. Even toward the end
of the study period, when the crackdown had begun to taper off,
SMPs appeared more frequently in criminal matters.401 Of
course, these defendants are not just the elite market
participants of insider trading rhetoric. Prosecutors often target
lower level employees from hedge funds and investment banks
to obtain their cooperation.402
By contrast, the SEC cases are dominated by opportunistic
tips passed to friends and family members. As Table 8 shows,
44.64 percent of the civil enforcement cases involved friends or
family members trading on tips, often from mid-level corporate
insiders. A typical example involved a marketing director who
traded and then tipped his father-in-law when he learned that
his company was about to be acquired.403 The significance of
these kinds of tippees in the SEC’s enforcement program
highlights the importance of the Supreme Court’s recent

400. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Vance, No. 13-cv-00172 (D. Or. Jan.
30, 2013), ECF No. 1 (IT employee).
401. For FY 2014–2015, 30.43 percent of defendants in cases with criminal
enforcement were SMPs compared to just 6.60 percent of cases without a
criminal component.
402. See, e.g., Information ¶ 1, United States v. Cardillo, No. 11-cr-00078
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2011), ECF No. 4 (trader).
403. See SEC Files Settled Insider Trading Action against Pharmaceutical
Company Executive and His Father-In-Law, Litigation Release No. 22474,
2012 SEC LEXIS 2827 (Sept. 6, 2012).
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Salman404 decision, which re-affirmed that a gift of inside
information to a relative or friend could provide a basis for
liability under Rule 10b-5.405
C.

Insider Trading Activity

Insider trading can involve a range of conduct. The most
serious cases involve complex networks of individuals who trade
tips or SMPs who cultivate a wide array of sources at companies
or expert network firms. In popular depictions, savvy market
operators receive inside information from multiple, often
unrelated sources, using their financial resources to earn
enormous profits.406 To maximize returns, more sophisticated
traders employ options or other derivative instruments rather
than common shares. They take elaborate steps to disguise their
trading, such as conducting it through offshore accounts,407 or
using disposable cell phones408 or communicating in code.409 If
an investigation is launched, they may lie to investigators,
destroy evidence, or otherwise obstruct justice.410 These factors
are generally reflected in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as
markers of more serious crimes warranting longer sentences.411

404. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
405. Id. at 429.
406. See supra Part II.A.
407. See Affidavit of Special Agent Ryan Lane in Support of an Application
for Criminal Complaint at 3–6, United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-cr-10131 (D.
Mass. Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 3-1 (identifying three different brokerage
accounts used in insider trading scheme).
408. See Complaint ¶¶ 23–27, 32–34, United States v. Jorgenson, No.
14-cr-00120 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2013), ECF No. 1 (noting trading tactics).
409. See Sealed Complaint ¶ 14, United States v. Zwerko, No. 14-cr-00715
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014), ECF No. 1 (explaining how traders operated their
scheme).
410. See Information ¶¶ 4–6, United States v. Freeman, No. 11-cr-00116
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011), ECF No. 1 (witness tampering); Indictment ¶¶ 9–11,
United States v. Jiau, No. 11-cr-00161 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2011), ECF No. 9.
411. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.3, 3C1.1 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (providing adjustments to the offense level based on the
defendant’s role in committing the offense such as aggravating role, abuse of
position of trust, use of special skill, and obstructing and impeding the
administration of justice).
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But insider trading can also be a far simpler affair. A
company employee may learn of an impending transaction and
make a rash decision to buy shares.412 He (or occasionally she)413
may tip the information to a friend, who may earn a small
profit.414 In a rational insider trading enforcement system,
larger and more sophisticated schemes should be more likely to
be subject criminal enforcement than smaller, less sophisticated
one-off transactions.
The evidence suggests that enforcers reliably draw these
distinctions. Civil insider trading cases typically involve a single
incident of insider trading as opposed to systematic attempts to
obtain and deploy MNPI. As shown in Table 9, nearly 80 percent
of civil enforcement actions involve a single insider trading
episode, with mean (median) events of 2.6 (1).415 By contrast, the
mean for criminal cases is 5.1, with a median of 3. While the
differences between civil and criminal enforcement actions are
significant, it is important to observe that the alleged activity
may not be the best measure of the actual number of insider
trading incidents. Proof problems or strategic litigation
decisions may cause enforcers to allege fewer incidents than the
number for which they have some evidence. Charging practices
might also understate the differences between civil and criminal
cases. Prosecutors may, for example, lodge fewer charges
against cooperating witnesses in order to affect sentencing
calculations. Still, the available evidence suggests purely civil
cases general involve less serious violations. Overall, 79.7
412. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1–12, SEC v. Pupynin, No. 14-cv-07482
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014), ECF No. 1 (alleging that an IT employee at a law
firm illegally purchased stock and stock options in companies that the law firm
represented prior to their impending deal announcements).
413. Insider trading defendants are overwhelmingly (95 percent) men. See
supra Table 1 (showing that male defendants constitute 93.2 percent of civil
enforcement cases and 97.3 percent of criminal enforcement cases).
414. See, e.g., Bolan, Exchange Act Release No. 73244, 2014 SEC LEXIS
5115 (Sept. 24, 2014) (reporting that a Wells Fargo employee leaked material
nonpublic information to a trusted friend and a former colleague).
415. The mean in civil enforcement actions is skewed by a single case in
which employees of a credit card processing company were alleged to have
used MNPI to trade on 140 separate occasions. See Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, SEC v.
Huang, No. 15-cv-00269 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2015), ECF No. 1. Without that
case, the mean for civil cases would be 1.6.
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percent of civil cases with a single insider trading event involved
MNPI about an impending M&A transaction, the quintessential
one-off, opportunistic trade.
Table 9
Alleged Insider Trading Activity
Panel A
IT Events **

Mean
3.59

Median
1.00

SD
10.27

Criminal

5.11

3.00

6.94

Noncriminal

2.59

1.00

11.86

Network Size ***
Criminal

5.32
7.46

4.00
5.00

4.48
5.34

Noncriminal

3.93

3.00

3.11

Count

Percentage by
Case Type

Criminal

64

34.59%

Noncriminal

169

60.36%

Criminal

26

14.05%

Noncriminal

35

12.50%

Criminal

54

29.19%

Noncriminal

34

12.14%

Criminal

41

22.16%

Noncriminal

42

15.00%

Criminal

70

63.06%

Noncriminal

41

36.94%

Panel B

Security***
Common Shares Only

Options/Other Derivatives

No Trading

Common Shares & Options

Concealment/Obstruction***

Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001
Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents.
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In cases without criminal enforcement, the mean (median)
size of the insider trading network was 3.92 (3) individuals. In
criminal cases, by contrast, the mean (median) network
contained 7.5 (5) traders. In other words, the insider trading
that is subject to civil enforcement typically involves a small
group of often closely linked individuals. For a standard
scenario, consider the case of Loretta Itri, an executive of Genta,
Inc., a now bankrupt biopharmaceutical company.416 In October
2009, Genta announced that its Phase 3 trial for a melanoma
drug in development had not shown any statistically significant
benefit.417 Given Genta’s size and its reliance on the drug, the
company’s stock price dropped 70 percent after the
announcement.418 A day before, Dr. Itri disclosed the results to
her friend and medical school classmate who in turn tipped his
patient.419 As is typical for civil cases, Dr. Itri learned one piece
of MNPI.420 There was no scheme to traffic in multiple pieces of
MNPI.
One proxy for sophistication is the type of security traded.
The least sophisticated traders employing MNPI are most likely
to trade common shares, even though options or other
derivatives might yield greater returns. Enforcement actions
against such traders are significantly more likely to be civil
rather than criminal. As Table 9 shows, more than 60 percent
of defendants in civil cases traded only common stock, compared
to just 35 percent of criminal defendants. With larger, more
complex networks, criminal defendants are more likely to be
either tippers or SMPs, who trade not for their own accounts but
for the accounts of their firm or their clients.
A final significant difference between criminal and civil
enforcement is the frequency of allegations that the defendants
took steps to conceal their activity or obstruct the investigation.
Table 9 shows that these allegations are made against a
416. See Complaint at 3, SEC v. Itri, No. 14-cv-02525 (D.N.J. Apr. 21,
2014), ECF No. 1.
417. See id. at 4–5.
418. See id. at 5.
419. Dr. Moskowitz allegedly advised three other unspecified individuals
to sell Genta stock after learning MNPI from Dr. Itri. The SEC did not pursue
claims against those individuals. Id. at 8–9.
420. See id. at 8.
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significantly higher percentage of criminal defendants (63.1
percent) than civil ones (36.9 percent). Typical examples include
trading through unrelated or offshore accounts, using
disposable cell phones, communicating in code language, and
lying to investigators or destroying documents.421 Facts like
these are important in criminal cases, where the government is
required to prove that the defendant acted willfully.422 Courts
generally require the defendant’s awareness that she was
engaged in a wrongful or unlawful act.423 Elaborate efforts to
avoid detection provide circumstantial evidence of willfulness.
Likewise, actions to cover-up wrongdoing in the face of an
investigation may be admissible as evidence of the defendant’s
consciousness of guilt, further bolstering the government’s
case.424
D.

Tippers, Tippees, and Remote Tippees

The most rudimentary insider trading cases involve a single
individual who learns MNPI and trades on it. An only slightly
more complicated case involves an individual who learns MNPI
and, rather than or in addition to trading, passes it on to another
who trades. If the original source was Level 0, the immediate
tippee is Level 1. Level 1 defendants might also be thought to
include individuals who misappropriate information from a
source to whom they owe a duty.

421. See cases cited supra notes 407–410.
422. See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971,
2007–08 (2006) (explaining that the Supreme Court has generally required
proof of willfulness in cases alleging white collar crimes).
423. See United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 2010)
(concluding that willfulness only requires an awareness of the general
wrongfulness, not unlawfulness, of conduct); United States v. Cassese, 428
F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining willfulness as “a realization on the
defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act” (quoting United States v.
Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970))).
424. See United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 761 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding that spoilation of evidence is relevant to consciousness of guilt);
United States v. Martoma, No. 12-cr-00973, 2014 WL 31700, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 6, 2014) (“Evidence of a party’s consciousness of guilt may be relevant if
reasonable inferences can be drawn from it and if the evidence is probative of
guilt.” (quoting United States v. Perez. 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir.2004))).
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From those simple cases, it is easy to increase the
complexity. There could be multiple Level 0 sources or multiple
Level 1 tippees, all of whom learned the MNPI from the same
source. Any of the Level 1 tippees could pass the MNPI to a
Level 2 tippee, and any of those could pass it to a Level 3 tippee
and so on. Generally speaking, any tippee who receives the
information from another tippee is defined as a remote tippee.425
Theoretically, the chain could continue indefinitely.
Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court’s Dirks v. SEC426
decision governed tipper-tippee liability. It requires that the
tipper receives a direct or indirect personal benefit for the tip.427
For much of that time, proving benefit was not difficult, with
courts often accepting that rather tenuous benefits satisfied the
Dirks standard.428 Indeed, the standard was so weak that in
many cases in the dataset there was no alleged benefit.429 In
2014, however, the Second Circuit decided United States v.
Newman,430 a case involving Level 3 and 4 tippees. 431 There, the
court tightened the benefit requirement. Inferring a benefit
from a gift of insider information, the court held, was only
permissible if the government could prove “a meaningfully close
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain
of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”432
Newman spawned a cottage industry of commentary, with
various takes on the correctness of the decision and its potential
425. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426 (2016) (defining a
remote tippee as a “tippee[] who receive[s] inside information from another
tippee, rather than the tipper”).
426. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
427. See id. at 663–64 (stating that the initial inquiry is “whether the
insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure”).
428. See United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating
that personal benefit included free meals, jars of honey, and live lobsters).
429. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1–4, SEC v. Amin, No. 12-cv-03960 (C.D. Cal.
May 7, 2012), ECF No. 1.
430. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), overruled in part by Salman v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
431. See id. at 443 (“Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed
from the corporate insiders and there was no evidence that either was aware
of the source of the inside information.”).
432. Id.
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impact on enforcers.433 Some thought the decision was
appropriate because enforcers pursued overly aggressive
actions against individuals far removed from the source of the
information.434 In 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Dirks’
gift test.435 The Second Circuit continued to debate what if
anything remained of the stricter scrutiny Newman signaled.436
The concern exhibited about remote tippees, however, is
wildly out of proportion to their actual significance in insider
trading enforcement actions. As shown in Table 10, a little over
71 percent of defendants are Level 0 or 1, that is, individuals
who were either the original source of the MPNI or learned of it
directly from that source. In other words, seven out of ten
defendants are not remote tippees. When remote tippees do
appear in enforcement cases, they are typically not far removed
from the original source. Over 72 percent of remote tippees are
Level 2 tippees, individuals who are only one step removed from
the original source of the information. Indeed, more than 92
percent of defendants are Level 2 or closer. In the sample, there
were only thirty-seven defendants who were Level 3 or beyond.

433. See Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
69 FLA. L. REV. 519, 569–70 (2017) (concluding that the personal benefit test
is no longer useful and necessary to find tipper-tippee liability); see generally
Nagy, supra note 115, at 28–29 (discussing the implications of the Salman
case).
434. See Macey, supra note 30, at 68–69 (stating that Newman recognized
the valid reasons why corporate insiders would disclose MNPI to capital
market participants in advance of its general release to the public).
435. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016)
(reaffirming Dirks’ test that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a
gift of confidential information to “a trading relative”).
436. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“Salman fundamentally altered the analysis underlying Newman’s
‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ requirement such that the
‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ requirement is no longer good
law.”), vacated on other grounds, No. 14-3599, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 37437
(2d Cir. June 25, 2018).

1731

REAL INSIDER TRADING
Table 10
Insider Trading Defendant Levels
Level
0
1
2
3
4
5
Total

Overall
151
181
96
24
12
1
465

(32.47)
(38.92)
(20.65)
(5.16)
(2.58)
(0.22)

Pre-Newman
137
(33.83)
154
(38.02)
77
(19.01)
24
(5.03)
12
(2.96)
1
(0.25)
405

Post-Newman
14
(23.33)
27
(45.00)
19
(31.67)
0
(0.00)
0
(0.00)
0
(0.00)
60

These results are consistent with the view that enforcers
tend to pursue relatively routine cases where the likelihood of
liability is higher. Even before Newman, the farther the
defendant was from the source of the information, the harder it
was for enforcers to show the elements for tipper-tippee liability.
But even more importantly, these results demonstrate that
enforcers are responsive to judicial efforts to rein in what they
perceive to be aggressive enforcement efforts. Before Newman,
cases against tippees who were Level 3 or greater were rare,
occurring in just 9.1 percent of cases. After Newman, civil or
criminal enforcement authorities did not file a single action
against such a defendant. After Newman, the only cases in the
dataset that civil and criminal enforcement authorities brought
against remote tippees were against Level 2 traders.
Given the anecdotal evidence regarding enforcers’ risk
aversion, it seems reasonable to attribute the relative paucity of
cases against remote tippees to their reluctance to bring risky
cases. In civil cases in the dataset involving Level 0–2
defendants, the SEC prevailed in 93.5 percent of the cases.
When it pursued actions against Level 3–5 defendants, its win
rate dropped to 83.8 percent, a difference that is significant at
less than 5 percent. The same is true in criminal cases.
Prosecutors obtained convictions or pleas in over 90 percent of
the cases they brought against Level 0 or 1 defendants. Those
rates dropped to 79.0 percent for Level 2 defendants, 64.7
percent for Level 3 defendants, and 28.6 percent for Level 4
defendants.437 In other words, Newman appears to have
437.

Prosecutors did not charge any defendants beyond Level 4.
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reinforced the already strong incentives not to pursue cases
against remote tippees. These data, in other words, provide
strong evidence for the law-making partnership model that
Professors Fisch and Nagy have articulated.438
E.

Insider Trading Profits

As Table 11 shows, on average criminal cases involve more
profitable insider trading episodes than civil ones. There are no
significant differences in the traders’ direct profits between
these subsets. But with the larger networks and increased
presence of SMPs in criminal cases, the downstream
profits—defined as the sum of profits earned by all individuals
who traded on the information as a result of a direct or indirect
tip from the defendant—are significantly larger. Downstream
tippees in criminal cases have mean profits of around $7.05
million, compared to $1.55 million in civil cases.
Table 11
Alleged Profits in Insider Trading Enforcement
Actions
Direct Profits

Mean
992.68

Median
58.87

SD
7,365.75

Criminal

817.97

130.75

2,749.51

Noncriminal

1,105.62

46.73

9,194.64

Downstream Profits ***
Criminal

3,689.65
7,046.95

5.55
642.98

20,434.800
24,318.00

Noncriminal

1,555.37

0.00

17,235.00

Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001
Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents. Profits are in
constant 2016 dollars reported in thousands.

What is even more notable than the disparities between
civil and criminal cases are how skewed the data on insider
trading profits are. The average direct profit for the sample is
$992,680, but the median profit is only $58,870. In part, this is
438.

See supra Part II.B.
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due to the presence of a significant number of tippers, who often
have no alleged trading profits. But it is also the case that most
defendants earn comparatively small profits while a handful of
traders earn substantial ones. The interquartile range for direct
profits is $11,586 to $261,821. By contrast, the 99th percentile
is $16.6 million. Or, to put it another way, the total direct profit
of all insider trading defendants in the sample was $457.6
million. A subset of just five traders (about 1 percent of the
sample) had direct profits totaling $255.7 million, or 55.9
percent of the total.
Although not as skewed as direct profits, the same general
pattern applies to downstream profits. Indeed, the median
downstream profit in civil cases is $0, further supporting the
hypothesis that civil cases tend to involve one-off claims against
individuals rather than systematic schemes involving networks
of traders. Overall, the interquartile range for downstream
profits is $0 to $656,826. The 99th percentile is one-hundred
times larger at $65.6 million.
It is the cases with small direct and downstream profits
that dominate the civil cases settled within thirty days of filing.
Recall that nearly half of the SEC’s cases settle within that
short timeframe.439 Given the small amounts at stake in these
cases and the high costs of litigation, it seems reasonable to
assume that enforcement officials can anticipate that
defendants will be willing to settle them expeditiously. The
mean (median) direct profits for defendants in those cases is
$118,505 ($37,657). The median defendant in these cases was a
solitary trader who did not tip and who therefore generated no
downstream profits. In short, the SEC’s insider trading
enforcement docket is dominated by defendants who earned
small profits from their own trading and who settle quickly.
F.

Are Criminal Cases Different?

Are criminal prosecutions reserved for more serious cases
of insider trading, as the foregoing univariate data suggest?
Table 12 reports the results of a logistic regression with criminal
enforcement as the dependent variable. The results show
439.

See supra Table 7.

1734

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1647 (2020)

significant differences between civil and criminal cases, which
suggest that criminal actions are generally reserved for more
serious insider trading episodes. All else being equal,
defendants who participate in larger networks and obtain larger
direct and downstream profits have significantly greater odds of
being criminally prosecuted. The significant result for Level
reflects the same association between complex trading networks
and the likelihood of criminal prosecution. Facts suggesting
knowingly wrongful conduct also increase the likelihood of
criminal prosecution. The odds that defendants who are alleged
to have engaged in attempts to conceal their activities or
obstruct an investigation will face criminal prosecution are
about four times higher than those without such allegations.
More sophisticated defendants (as measured by the kinds of
securities traded) face higher odds of criminal prosecution as
well.
The regression results only partially support the rhetoric
that criminal prosecutions target the “most advantaged,
privileged, and wealthy insiders in modern finance.” 440 This is
certainly true of SMPs, whose odds of facing criminal
prosecution are over four times greater than the reference
category of miscellaneous defendants. There is similarly some
evidence that criminal enforcement authorities target
substantial fiduciary breaches. Lawyers alleged to have
engaged in insider trading are six times more likely than other
defendants to face criminal prosecution, although that
correlation is only significant at 10 percent. But there is no
statistically significant relationship between criminal
prosecution and being a director or officer, a result that may be
driven by the paucity of such defendants in the dataset.

440.

Bharara, supra note 14.
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Table 12
Logistic Regression Criminal Enforcement
Odds
Ratio
1.184
1.014
1.519

Robust
SE
(.046)***
(.011)
(.282)*

95%
Confidence
Interval
1.097
1.277
0.993
1.204
1.055
2.186

Officer/Director
Other Employee
SMP
Lawyer
Other Professional
Friends & Family
MNPI

2.111
2.181
4.589
5.928
1.013
1.545

(1.574)
(1.603)
(2.821)**
(6.572)
(0.793)
(0.874)

0.490
0.516
1.375
0.765
0.219
0.510

9.099
9.211
15.311
52.067
4.697
4.679

Financial
M&A Activity
Product Approval
Security

1.586
1.550
1.996

(0.997)
(0.873)
(1.534)

0.462
0.514
0.440

5.437
4.676
9.052

Options/Derivatives
No Trading
Common Shares & Options

2.480
2.918
2.904

(0.966)*
(1.364)*
(1.123)**

1.156
1.167
1.361

5.319
7.293
6.195

Log Direct Profit
Log Downstream Profit
Concealment/Obstruction
Gender
Constant
Observations

1.101
1.154
4.485
0.294
0.003
457

(0.040)**
(0.027)***
(1.294)***
(0.230)
(0.003)***

1.026
1.102
2.439
0.635
0.000

1.182
1.209
8.246
1.365
0.019

Wald χ2

126.54

Network Size
IT Events
Level
Defendant Type

χ2

Prob >

0.000

Pseudo r2

0.360

Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001

While it is certainly possible to question the resources the
SEC devotes to small insider trading matters and whether that
allocation makes sense in light of the agency’s deterrence and
other goals, the evidence at least suggests a reasonable
allocation between civil and criminal cases. The SEC focuses its
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efforts on smaller, often opportunistic cases where there seems
little risk that the defendants will have the opportunity to
engage in future violations. After all, how many times will a
middle manager learn that his company is about to be acquired?
If enforcers make the decision to pursue such cases, civil, rather
than criminal, enforcement seems entirely appropriate.
This analysis also suggests that market participants have
relatively clear notice of the activities that will lead to criminal
enforcement. Criminal enforcement is more likely to target
more systematic and sophisticated insider trading episodes and
those where the profits were higher. Consistent with
enforcement rhetoric, SMPs should be aware that they face a
much higher likelihood of prosecution than other market
participants.
G.

The SEC and Low Hanging Fruit

A good deal of the univariate data reported in this section
suggests that the SEC pursues relatively straightforward cases
that it believes will be resolved quickly and easily. The SEC
cases are dominated by isolated instances of opportunistic
trading. They often involve mid-level employees or their friends
and family, come from referrals from FINRA, and have
relatively small profits. But for SEC attorneys to target
incidents they think will be resolved without much litigation
effort requires that they have the ability to identify observable
case characteristics associated with quick settlements. Are
there pre-filing case characteristics that are correlated with the
length of litigation?
To analyze that question, I ran linear regressions with Civil
Case Length (the time in days from the date the SEC files the
complaint until the final judgment is entered) as the dependent
variable. The only variables included in the analysis (with one
exception) are those SEC enforcers could observe prior to case
filing. The exception is whether there is a criminal enforcement
action involving the same defendant, which may not be filed
until after the SEC action. Criminal cases, however, almost
invariably result in the stay of civil proceedings, making
criminal enforcement a necessary control variable. The results
appear in Table 13.
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There are two main results for Model 1. First, Civil Case
Length is positively correlated with the total profits the
defendants in the insider trading network earned. Not
surprisingly, the larger the profits the longer the case takes to
resolve, all else being equal. Second, cases with FINRA referrals
settle much more quickly. On average, a case with a FINRA
referral is resolved 153 days faster (about five months) than
cases without such referrals. That means SEC enforcement
attorneys can reliably predict that the small cases they get from
FINRA will be resolved quickly, with minimal post-filing effort
and with little risk of loss.
But the ease with which the SEC can expect to settle a case
will likely depend not just on these isolated factors, but on a
combination of case characteristics. To test this theory, Model 2
contains interaction terms for two key variables—the type of
security the defendant traded and the nature of the MNPI. In
Model 2, both Total Profit and FINRA remain significant and
with the same sign as Model 1. But Model 2 also contains
evidence that the SEC has the ability to identify case
characteristics that are correlated with speed of resolution.
Cases that feature common share trading before M&A activity
settle significantly more quickly than other cases. The same is
true of cases involving defendants who trade either common
shares or a combination of shares and options before product
approval announcements.
Table 13
Linear Regression Civil Case Length
Model 1
Coef.
Robust SE

Model 2
Coef.

Robust SE

Log Total Profit
Defendant Type

39.781

(14.367)**

39.184

(14.364)**

Officer/Director
Other Employee
SMP
Lawyer
Other Professional
Friends & Family

138.479
-24.859
107.820
-9.472
-96.642
93.365

(117.781)
(104.257)
(97.580)
(149.013)
(99.254)
(89.476)

128.741
-46.040
79.531
-47.190
-111.978
84.685

(122.537)
(104.549)
(100.470)
(155.277)
(101.113)
(93.0523)

Criminal Enforcement

234.955

(74.814)**

254.608

(74.875)***
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Model 1
Coef.
Robust SE

Model 2
Coef.

Robust SE

FINRA
ORSA
FBI
IT Events
Network Size
Level
Concealment/Obstruction
Security

-152.675
94.587
77.328
-1.957
-4.892
-1.968
27.766

(56.128)**
(56.020)
(60.654)
(1.247)
(6.199)
(30.201)
(54.204)

-149.393
91.596
59.334
-1.517
-1.164
-4.548
33.195

(56.152)**
(56.275)
(63.491)
(1.353)
(6.351)
(30.379)
(55.046)

Common Shares
Options/Derivatives
Common Shares & Options
MNPI

46.888
121.326
88.942

(69.786)
(99.059)
(81.395)

537.340
355.951
223.577

(212.290)*
(318.866)
(147.003)

Financial
M&A Activity
Product Approval
Interaction Terms

-155.188
-182.358
-191.357

(133.477)
(121.586)
(157.201)

117.693
277.061
248.662

(114.575)
(122.671)*
(190.556)

Financial x Common Shares

-365.929

(235.156)

Financial x
Options/Derivative
Financial x Common Shares
& Options
M&A x Common Shares

-127.147

(350.019)

114.362

(176.046)

-566.695

(207.147)**

M&A x Options/Derivative

-315.768

(331.801)

M&A x Common Shares &
Options
Product Approval x Common
Shares
Product Approval x
Options/Derivative
Product Approval x Common
Shares & Options

-222.253

(168.796)

-571.942

(279.855)*

0.000

(omitted)

-448.489

(224.441)*

Constant
-95.440
(219.761)
Observations
403
r2
0.259
Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001

0.000
403
0.276

0.019
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As discussed in Part V, these cases tend to involve
indisputable MNPI. M&A cases dominate the SEC docket.441
These factors, along with the fact that the SEC tends to pursue
cases with comparatively small profits involving trading
exclusively in common shares,442 typically by lower level
employees and their friends and families,443 all support the
same hypothesis. Not only does the SEC have the ability to
identify obvious cases of insider trading that are likely to settle
quickly, but these cases dominate the SEC’s docket. To be sure,
the reasons that shape SEC case selection remain uncertain.
This pattern of cases could just as easily support an inference of
an administrative agency looking to pad its enforcement
statistics or conserve scarce trial resources as it could loss
averse enforcement personnel making overly conservative case
choices. Perhaps all of these factors are at work. But the bottom
line remains the same—civil insider trading enforcement
focuses predominantly on the lowest hanging fruit.
VIII.

Conclusion

There is a large gap in the debate on insider trading
enforcement. The enforcement rhetoric focuses on policing
market fairness by targeting SMPs and other elite market
participants. Academic critiques vary, alternatively portraying
a largely untethered insider trading doctrine that enforcers use
to expand their power and discretion or enforcers, beset with
agency cost problems, that bring simple, easily resolved cases to
create the appearance of vigorous enforcement.
This Article has sought to close that gap by a careful
analysis of insider trading enforcement data. The overall
pattern that emerges from these data is clear. Enforcement
authorities concentrate their efforts on cases involving
unquestionable MNPI. For the most part, they focus on
traditional fiduciary or other duties of trust and confidence,
441. See supra Table 2.
442. See supra Table 9 (showing that 34.5 percent of criminal cases and
60.36 percent of noncriminal cases involved trading exclusive in common
shares).
443. See supra Table 8 (showing that 38.06 percent of overall cases
involved trading with friends and families).
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although civil enforcement authorities appear more willing to
expansively apply Rule 10b5-2. Both civil and criminal enforcers
appear to focus their efforts on fairly routine cases of insider
trading. Especially on the civil side, those cases typically are
brought against mid-level employees and their friends and
family, who have earned comparatively low profits usually in
one-off transactions rather than through systematic insider
trading schemes. These cases are routinely settled within days
of filing. Enforcers infrequently bring claims against remote
tippees and carve back on such cases when they perceive stricter
scrutiny from the judiciary. There are significant differences
between criminal and civil cases, with the former focusing
largely on what appear to be more serious insider trading
episodes.
None of these data suggest any meaningful doctrinal
overreach, and thus there seems little reason to define these
elements more precisely via specific statutory language. Indeed,
the pattern of cases suggests that market participants can
anticipate with a fair degree of certainty the kinds of activities
that will be subject to governmental enforcement, both civilly
and criminally. And, if anything, the data suggest that the SEC
focuses too many of its enforcement resources on the least
sophisticated episodes of insider trading. The analysis here
shows that the agency devotes a substantial portion of its
resources to cases that it can anticipate will settle quickly and
easily. These enforcement practices raise substantial concerns
about the deterrent impact of the SEC’s insider trading cases.
This Article has only begun to analyze insider trading
enforcement and many questions remain unanswered. Future
research, for example, can analyze how insider trading is
punished
and
whether
the
panoply
of
available
penalties—incarceration, supervised release, disgorgement,
and civil and criminal fines—are employed consistently across
defendants. To the extent that researchers can gain access to
SRO referrals or SEC investigative files, they could better
analyze how cases are selected for enforcement. A larger dataset
extending over multiple administrations may also reveal the
extent to which enforcement priorities shift over time.
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Appendix: Data Definitions
Category/
Type
Variable
Litigation
Characteristics
FINRA
Categorical

Description

1 if FINRA made a
referral to the SEC and
0 otherwise.
1 if the FBI or US
Attorneys made a
referral to the SEC and
0 otherwise.

FBI

Categorical

ORSA

Categorical

Market Abuse

Categorical

Lag

Continuous

Case Length

Continuous

Time in days from when
the action is commenced
until the final judgment
(civil cases), sentencing
(criminal cases), or other
resolution
(administrative actions).

Enforcement
Type

Categorical

Indicator variable for
any of the following

1 if the Options
Regulatory Authority
made a referral to the
SEC and 0 otherwise.
1 if the SEC’s Market
Abuse Unit assisted in
the investigation and 0
otherwise.
Time in days between
first alleged insider
trading incident and
filing of first action
against defendant.

Source

SEC Litigation
Releases
SEC Litigation
Releases; US
Department of
Justice Press
releases
SEC Litigation
Releases

SEC Litigation
Releases

SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information;
Bloomberg Dockets
SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information;
Bloomberg Dockets
Bloomberg Dockets
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potential enforcement
types: (1) civil only; (2)
criminal only; (3) SEC
administrative action
only; (4) civil and
criminal; (5) civil and
administrative; (6) civil,
criminal, and
administrative, and (7)
criminal and
administrative.

Defendant
Characteristics
Defendant Type Categorical

Gender

Categorical

Indicator variable for the
following categories of
defendants, defined
through either their
relationship to the
source of the information
or through their
occupation: (1) Officers
and Directors; (2) Other
Employee; (3) Securities
Market Professional
(SMP); (4) Lawyer; (5)
Other Professional; (6)
Friends and Family; or
(7) Other. Officers and
Directors include only
members of the board
and the most senior
executives of the firm,
including the CEO, CFO,
COO, and the General
Counsel.
Male or female
defendant.

SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information

SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal

1743

REAL INSIDER TRADING

Direct Profits

Continuous

Downstream
Profits

Continuous

Nature of
Allegations
Basis of
Liability

IT Events

Categorical

Continuous

The total profits the
named defendant is
alleged to have earned
from improper insider
trading activity in
inflation-adjusted 2016
dollars.
The total profits of all
traders who learned,
either directly or
indirectly, the MNPI
from the named
defendant in inflationadjusted 2016 dollars.

Activity in which
defendant was alleged to
have engaged: (1)
trading; (2) tipping only;
(3) trading after tip; and
(4) trading and tipping.

Indictment or
Information
SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information
SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information

SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information
The number of separate SEC Complaint;
incidents of trading or
SEC Order
tipping associated with Instituting
each piece of MNPI in
Proceedings;
the defendant’s
Criminal
possession. For example, Indictment or
if the defendant learns a Information
single piece of MNPI and
trades on it, IT Events
will be 1 regardless of
how the trader divides
up the trading activity.
If the trader also tips a
single individual, IT
Events will equal 2.
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Network Size

Continuous

Security

Categorical

Concealment/
Obstruction

Categorical

The number of
individuals participating
in the alleged insider
trading scheme.

SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information
Indicator variable
SEC Complaint;
defining the securities
SEC Order
the defendant either
Instituting
purchased or sold: (1)
Proceedings;
common shares only; (2) Criminal
options or other
Indictment or
derivative securities; (3) Information
a combination of
common shares and
options; or (4) no
trading. The no trading
category is used in two
situations: (1)
defendants who tip but
do not trade or (2)
defendants who do not
trade for their own
account. The latter
category would include,
for example, a hedge
fund portfolio manager
who traded for his or her
fund but not for his or
her own account. If the
defendant had multiple
insider trading events,
only the largest trade
(measured by profit) was
coded.
1 if there is any
SEC Complaint;
allegation of such
SEC Order
conduct and 0 otherwise. Instituting
Examples include using Proceedings;
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Level

Continuous

MNPI

Categorical

Industry

Categorical

Duty

Categorical

coded language or
disposable cell phones,
lying to investigators, or
destroying documents.
Measure of the
defendant’s distance
from the original source
of the information. 0
represents the original
source of the
information. 1 includes
both direct tippees and
those who
misappropriate
information from the
original source.
Indicator variable
defining the type of
material nonpublic
information the
defendant possessed.
The categories are as
follows: (1) M&A
activity; (2) financial
information; (3) product
approval; or (4) other. If
the defendant had
multiple insider trading
events, only the largest
trade (measured by
profit) was coded.
Industry in which the
company operated. If the
defendant had multiple
insider trading events,
only the largest trade
(measured by profit) was
coded.
In misappropriation
cases, the nature of the

Criminal
Indictment or
Information
SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information

SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information

EDGAR; Mergent
Intellect

SEC Complaint;
SEC Order
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duty the defendant is
alleged to have violated.
The categories are as
follows: (1) employment;
(2) other traditional
fiduciary duties
(including, lawyer-client
or doctor-patient); (3)
family relationship; (4)
friendship; (5)
confidentiality
agreement; or (6) other.

Instituting
Proceedings;
Criminal
Indictment or
Information

